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## SPAIN/VITORIA



**“WE WILL NEVER FORGET!”**

● the present crisis in china ●




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# Spain: VITORIA

## “Brothers, we will never forget!”

by M. SAURA

### The courage of a people

Wednesday, March 3. The struggle of the workers of Vitoria for their demands — very similar to those now being put forward in the immense majority of platforms throughout the country: 5,000-6,000 pesetas per month across-the-board wage increases; forty- or forty-two-hour workweek; full wages in case of illness, accident, or unemployment; no layoffs, etc. — seemed to be beginning to break down the intransigence that had been manifested by the employers for two months. The last remaining obstacles to negotiations were the twenty-two workers laid off at Forjas Alavesas and the workers laid off or disciplined at Apellániz. The coordinating committee of striking workers, formed by representatives elected in factory assemblies, had once again called for a general strike to demand the rehiring of all workers laid off and the lifting of all disciplinary measures.

At seven o'clock in the morning of the following day, March 4, the first pickets began to be formed in the workers neighborhoods of Zaramaga, Adurza, and Arana, throughout the working-class belt in which a young proletariat, for the most part emigrants from the countryside in Alava or elsewhere in the country, has been concentrated over the past fifteen years, a working class that now constitutes the majority of the 150,000 inhabitants of Vitoria. At ten o'clock in the morning all the factories were already on strike, and the pickets

began marching toward the center of the city in groups of upwards of 5,000, chanting the slogan that has been heard hundreds of times during past months in Vigo, Madrid, Valencia, and Barcelona: “We are workers, join us!” the cry of solidarity, of the general strike. In Spain today it is enough simply to say that — join us! Nobody asks why, the response is only too clear for everyone. And since the third day of March, has become even clearer.

By noon, all Vitoria was paralyzed. It was the fourth general strike call in the past three weeks, and without doubt it got the greatest response. Unlike what had generally been happening since the struggles began on January 9, the police moved in with extreme violence. This was no accident: The government and the employers believed that weariness would begin to erode the unity and combativity of the workers of Alava and had decided to take the offensive. They were making a mistake.

Right from the beginning, each police charge met with a determined response. The strikers fought back with sticks and stones and barricades were built, the classical barricades of workers struggles, now appearing, to the panic of the bourgeoisie of all political stripes, in many of the mass struggles in Spain. A demonstration of hundreds of women, who had played a fundamental

role in the Vitoria strike, was savagely repressed. A group of workers who had taken refuge in a gasoline station threatened to burn it down if the police attacked. The police disappeared, and a slaughter was able to be averted that time.

Tension mounted. Only at two o'clock in the afternoon, when the police temporarily withdrew to their barracks — for Vitoria had suffered a genuine police invasion, detachments having been brought in from other provinces — did the city appear calm. Later, official news reports would say that "the city had fallen into the hands of the strikers." That was precisely why it was calm, for the aggressors had withdrawn. The police were receiving "new orders." The content of these orders was soon to become clear.

At five o'clock in the afternoon a general assembly met in the San Francisco church in the Zaramaga neighborhood. It was the two hundred and ninth general assembly to meet in Vitoria since January 9! More than 5,000 strikers were inside the church, a more or less average attendance. Another 10,000 were outside. The police, following their "new orders," had surrounded the church and blocked the entrance. The well-known "tolerance" of the Francoist "reformers" toward mass actions went up in smoke in Vitoria, just as it had previously in Elda, where a worker had been murdered several days earlier, in Madrid, where violent clashes took place in January, in Barcelona, where striking construction workers had recently erected barricades, in Tarragona, where another worker had been murdered. When the worker delegates of the coordinating committee arrived to preside over the general assembly — and it is important to note that this has happened dozens of times in Vitoria during the past weeks, that the members of the coordinating committee, militants of the UGT, MCE, PCE, OCA, and LCR/ETA-VI\*, are known throughout the entire city and were elected democratically and openly by their comrades in struggle — that is, when the leaders of the strike arrived at the assembly after their usual preparatory meeting, they were prevented from entering the church. Clashes broke out in front of the church between the police and the people demanding the elementary right to participate in the assembly that was to make decisions about their strike. Suddenly, without prior warning, the police broke the glass of the church windows and threw smoke bombs and tear-gas grenades inside. When people saw smoke pouring out of the church, they began to shout, "They're smoking them out!" The indignation that then spread — without for a moment giving way to fear — was not, as official reports were later to claim, a re-

\*UGT: Unión General de Trabajadores — General Workers Union; MCE: Movimiento Comunista de España — Communist Movement of Spain; OCA: Organización de Comisiones Anticapitalistas — Organization of Anticapitalist Commissions; LCR/ETA-VI: Liga Comunista Revolucionaria/Euzkadi ta Askatasuna-VI — Revolutionary Communist League/Basque Nation and Freedom-VI, sympathizing organization of the Fourth International in Spain.

sult of lack of consciousness. On the contrary, it was the product of the consciousness developed during weeks of struggle, of the will to win, to repel any attack, that had taken root among all the people of Alava.

The workers left the church much more calmly than could have been expected; they were coming out to fight, not to run. Then the slaughter began: four dead, seventy-three taken to the hospital for gunshot wounds, hundreds of wounded who were cared for in their own homes. Such was the price that had to be paid for the struggle for the rehiring of a few dozen comrades in today's Spain being "cautiously" led toward "democracy" by the Francoist reformers.

But once again, the most savage repression was unable to halt the mass struggle for an instant. Immediately, all Vitoria was filled with barricades, the whole city took to the streets, spurred on by rage, struggling for hours, well into the night. With the blood of one of the murdered comrades, someone had written a word on the street, a word longed for by the Spanish people for years: Justice. This word, with its real meaning, the meaning supplied by the exploited and oppressed, immediately resounded throughout the country.

On March 4 Pamplona went on general strike at the call of the Assembly of Factory Delegates, a new body including some 500 representatives elected in the factories of Navarra. There were innumerable demonstrations of thousands of people; barricades were built when the police charged. In Vizcaya, the strike became practically general even before a united call was issued; the central strike committee, which included representatives of factories that had been struggling for their demands for some days, organized demonstrations that drew 15,000-20,000 people, demonstrations that lasted four or five hours and marched through the streets for miles: in Basauri, where there was another murder, in Sestao, Portugalete, Guetxo. In Catalonia, Vigo, Gijón, Zaragoza, Seville, Madrid, and Valencia there were work stoppages and demonstrations of solidarity and protest. The cry of the workers of Vitoria — "Vitoria! Brothers, we will not forget!" — summed up the sentiment brought to the struggle by hundreds of thousands of people throughout the country.

On the same day, March 4, Vitoria was militarily occupied by the police. Groups of more than three people were not allowed on the streets. But the barricades stayed up nonetheless. In this apparently deserted city, if anyone dared so much as to remove one stone of a barricade, tense and determined strikers immediately emerged from the doors of surrounding houses, sticks and stones in hand, defending their barricade. For the fight was not over in Vitoria; the struggle had to go on, and the barricades would still be needed. It had cost too much blood to erect them.

The funeral was held on March 5. Hours before it began there were 100,000 people in the cathedral and the square outside. One hundred thousand people chant-



## JUSTICIA — With the blood of one of the murdered comrades, someone had written a word on the street. . .

ing, paying homage to the murdered comrades, waving their handkerchiefs, making the sign of victory, raising their fists as the coffins passed by, bearing the coffins on their shoulders for hours, parading defiantly before the Guardia Civil, and shouting "Dissolve the repressive bodies!" at the police murderers. From the cemetery, a group of 3,000-4,000 men and women of Vitoria, without anyone directing them, guided by a spirit of deep and irrepressible solidarity, instinctively headed for the hospital where their wounded comrades were being treated. At the doors of the hospital they shouted: "Workers, wounded, we are here!" This "here" concentrated all the determination to continue struggling, not to abandon a single one of the motivations that had given life to two months of mass mobilization, motivations that were stronger than any bullets.

On Monday, March 8, an urgent united meeting of the Euzkadi leaderships of the PSOE, PCE, PTE, ORT, MCE, and LCR/ETA-VI\*, which was joined by the other political and trade-union workers organizations, called for a general strike. This time there were about 500,000 strikers in Euzkadi. Much more than ever before, but much less than the next time, thus continuing the

\*PSOE: Partido Socialista Obrero Español — Spanish Socialist Workers party, the Social Democracy; PTE: Partido del Trabajo de España — Labor party of Spain; ORT: Organización Revolucionaria de los Trabajadores — Revolutionary Workers Organization.

basic dynamic — ever higher and stronger — of the mass struggles of past years.

And Vitoria continued to fight. On Saturday, March 6, Minister of the Interior Fraga arrived, the man of "strong democracy," the admirer of Adenauer, the man who said "I will decide the timing of the reform," the man who nevertheless intends to exclude legalization of the workers movement from his reform plans, the man who blamed the Vitoria strike on "anarchism." The interior minister of the Francoist monarchy was going to try to save appearances in the city that had given the coup de grâce to his political program. Fraga ordered — at that late date! — the employers to rehire the workers who had been laid off. But by now, that was not enough. More demands were put forward: release of the six members of the coordinating body being held, freedom of assembly, recognition of the commissions elected in assemblies as the genuine representative of the workers. On Friday, March 12, Vitoria continued to struggle. No one had forgotten in Vitoria. And no one can ever forget Vitoria. In Spain today, nothing is as it was before Vitoria.

### The price of freedom

Vitoria is the most heroic link in the chain of mass struggles now being forged in Spain, particularly since January. It is not, of course, the sole link, nor will it be the last.

A violent revolutionary wind has penetrated the country, pushing its way through the fissures of the miserable political "concessions" the Francoist reform has been compelled to "tolerate" on its road toward puppet "democracy." This wind will not die down so long as a shadow or threat of exploitation and oppression remains.

Since the first silent peaceful demonstrations for amnesty, a new and striking phenomenon has taken shape: The masses are entering into political action, making their presence felt in the streets. People who have never — "never" meaning during forty years of dictatorship — "acted politically" have taken to the streets and met thousands of others like themselves, people struggling for the same objectives, confident of winning them by themselves, through their own actions. These workers, students, professionals, women from all over the country are learning to make their presence felt, to assert themselves in the factories and in the neighborhoods. All the latent demands — economic, political, and social — are coming to the fore, generating an enormous consciousness of solidarity, an immediate politicization of all struggles, a profound need for self-organization for the struggle.

All the bodies the mass movement considers useful for united activity have been utilized, regardless of the function these bodies are assigned by Francoist legality (neighborhood associations, trade unions, professional associations, housewives' associations). Concurrently, new bodies are being created and are replacing or combining with these older bodies in the course of action, always seeking the road capable of providing the greatest degree of representativity, the greatest coordination, the greatest extension of action. And always, in the very center, is the sovereign factory or branch assembly, the delegates, the commissions and committees elected in these assemblies, and, more recently, the massive pickets to extend the struggles, the self-defense pickets, which already represent a genuine acquisition of the movement, in spite of the hysterical press campaign that has been waged against them.

Thus, in January and February, during the struggles of the teachers in Madrid, the general assemblies sent delegations to factories in struggle — Chrysler, Pegaso — asking for and obtaining solidarity; in turn, the teachers' assemblies welcomed delegations from these workers' assemblies, from neighborhood coordinating bodies, and from tenants' associations, and together they discussed the demands and leadership of the struggle. And in February, when the construction workers went on strike in Barcelona, all the work sites elected delegates and the assembly of delegates took the lead in the mobilizations. In Pamplona something similar happened, as had already occurred in January during the Getafestrike in Madrid.

The slogans orienting the struggles are broadening, becoming unified, and radicalizing. Amnesty has broadened its content to the social terrain. It now also means the rehiring of all those fired or laid off for political reasons since 1939. At the Babcock-Wilson factory in

Vizcaya this demand has already been won. In other factories the struggle for it is continuing. In a few cases during the first demonstrations in January, the police were applauded because they refused to charge against the demonstrators. The press multiplied this applause by the thousands. But the inexperienced hands that were then applauding the police are now building barricades. The slogan of the dissolution of the repressive bodies is already part of the atmosphere being breathed in Spain today (and in spite of this, or rather because of it, during the united-action meeting that called the general strike in Euzkadi in solidarity with Vitoria, the PCE threatened to withdraw if this slogan was maintained, and this the day after the murders in Vitoria!). The cry of "Down with the CNS" (the state "trade-union" federation) is now part of all the platforms of demands. The need for a united class trade-union is felt by millions of workers; it is being discussed in detail in the assemblies of many factories. In Spain today, nobody dares assert that it is possible to "reform" or "take over" the CNS, the hated fascist vertical trade union. There is unanimous agreement on the necessity of destroying it. When addressing more than 30,000 workers in Pamplona, even the president of the Consejo Provincial de Trabajadores (Provincial Council of Workers), the highest provincial body of the vertical trade union, cried "Down with the CNS!" a cry that was taken up by thousands. The Congreso Sindical (trade-union congress), a force being prepared by the government, will undoubtedly provide an opportunity for a great independent mobilization of Spanish workers, who are already beginning to organize.

The "reform" projects of the government are stillborn; they belong to prehistory at a time when the masses are already writing history. The government proposes that sixteen conditions be met before a demonstration is organized, but every day there are dozens of demonstrations in the immense majority of the cities of the country, called for thousands of reasons by every imaginable body. Likewise, in order to organize a meeting "legally," it is necessary to go through god knows how many channels, but assemblies of thousands of workers, students, people of every profession are occurring factory by factory and city by city, while in Sabodel, Pamplona, and Vigo assemblies have to meet in football stadiums in order to accommodate all the people who turn out!

What remains of the Francoist "reform" after Vitoria? An open government crisis that may well drag on for weeks; a confrontation to the death within the Francoist apparatus, which has not even been able to agree on the formation of a so-called National Front, a defensive bloc of all the Francoist carrion; the army is suffering the consequences of the heavy sentences against the officers of the Unión Militar Democrática (Democratic Military Union) and is beginning to become concerned about the spread of soldiers' commissions (the streets of Madrid are full of painted slogans reading "Form soldiers' commissions") and the broad meetings that have been reported in Guipúzcoa, with dozens of soldiers attending.

The Francoist reform has been wrecked. "Fragamanlis," as the interior minister was called at the beginning of the year (to his evident satisfaction), has become "Fragachet," which is what he should have been called in the first place.

The bourgeoisie is observing this failure with growing concern, for the political consequences fully affect all the bourgeois political projects. The dynamic of the mass mobilizations is sending shivers down the spines of even the most "democratic" bourgeois politicians. For example, only a few days ago Ruiz-Gimenez (a Christian Democrat) affirmed in Rome: "We must advise that actions in the streets not be multiplied except for very serious reasons and with a great sense of responsibility."

The political project of the "democratic bourgeoisie" is becoming ever clearer, and so, unfortunately, is it becoming ever clearer that the submission of the reformist workers organizations to that project is limitless. Thus, the latest invention of the Junta Democrática and the Plataforma de Convergencia Democrática\*, which, once again, have remained on the fringes of the ongoing struggles or have even openly opposed them, is what they call an "agreed break" (*ruptura pactada*), a weak-willed and shameful formula offering a pact to the "Francoist reformers." This is being accompanied by a "tactical turn" that consists of eliminating from their communiqués any critical reference to the king and any call, no matter how distant, for the mythical "National Democratic Action" that used to be the recommended means of "breaking" with the dictatorship.

This brings us to the central problem of the present political situation in Spain. The bourgeoisie, subject to an economic crisis it sees no way out of, deprived of its old mechanisms of power, which were demolished by the death of the dictator, and lacking in any new mechanisms with which to replace the old, is facing a mass movement that daily rises to a higher level of organization, breadth, and combativity. Mired in a growing political paralysis, this bourgeoisie sees no way out other than evolution, than putting pressure on the king and a section of the present political apparatus to arrive at a "realistic pact" capable of slowing down the development of the activity of the masses. The function and role being played by the reformist organizations is to attempt to transmit this paralysis to the mass movement itself. During the recent strikes in Madrid, when known leaders of the Communist party were asked in a discussion meeting why they had not called for a general strike, the answer was always the same: "Because a provisional government has not yet been formed. The opposition is divided, and under these conditions the launching of a general strike would lead to chaos." It is becoming increasingly difficult for the Communist

\* The Junta Democrática (Democratic Council) is an interclass bloc created in July 1974 under the impetus of the Communist party; the Plataforma de Convergencia Democrática (Platform of Democratic Convergence) is a similar body, formed in 1975 under Social Democratic leadership.

party to make such cynical assertions in the assemblies and meetings of the vanguard. Now, after Vitoria, it is even more difficult.

During a general assembly of metalworkers in Barcelona called in connection with the next provincial congress — which affects more than 200,000 Barcelona workers — one worker said to his comrades, "We know that the same thing that happened to the comrade in Vitoria can happen to us. But we have to continue the struggle anyway." This phrase sums up the state of mind of the mass movement in Spain. Nothing will be able to stop this will to fight.

It is this will that constitutes the basic underpinning of the intervention of the revolutionary Marxists. We have been present in all the mobilizations of the final battle against Francoism, pushing for a line of class independence, self-organization, self-defense, and coordination among all the sectors in struggle toward the overthrow of the dictatorship. The March 11 issue of the Barcelona weekly *La Vanguardia* wrote, "Everything suggests that it is the LCR/ETA-VI that has capitalized on the recent conflict in Alava." To be sure, the journal of the Catalan bourgeoisie is exaggerating a bit. But it would be true to say that in Vitoria, as in the construction strike in Barcelona, in the strikes in Asturias, Vigo, Valencia, and Madrid, in the struggle of the teachers, in all the places where rebellion is mounting against oppression and exploitation, the militants of the LCR/ETA-VI have been in the vanguard of the movement, together with many other fighters and militants of other organizations struggling for the economic, social, and political demands of the masses, asserting their confidence in the masses, so that the very high price our people are paying for their freedom will not be wasted.

When the dictatorship has been destroyed, the working class and the people of Spain will be able to tell those who speak of "reconciliation": "We do not forget." And to those who talk of "social pact": "We do not forget." And to those who try to fool them with the rotten merchandise of "limited freedom," once again: "We do not forget."

For us of the LCR/ETA-VI, our task consists of strengthening this memory, organizing it, extending it, and through it building the section of the Fourth International in the territory of the Spanish state.

In Spain today, liberty is struggling to be born. To insist on how much we need the solidarity of the workers of all the world is to repeat the obvious. We know that the flame ignited against the murderous dictatorship with the day of international solidarity with Spain on September 3, 1975, has not been extinguished. Alert for Spain, comrades of all the world! For we need more third of Septembers. So that the blood of the workers never again flows in Spain! Down with the murderous dictatorship!

March 12, 1976

# FIVE EGYPTIAN MILITANTS STILL HELD IN PRISON

More information has been received about the revolutionary militants who were arrested in Egypt last summer. Initial reports from the official Egyptian press had said that twenty persons had been arrested in early July 1975 and charged with being members of the International Communist League, a revolutionary Marxist organization. (See INPRECOR, No. 33, September 11, 1975.) The Egyptian press reported that the arrested militants would be charged with having made contact with the Revolutionary Communist Group in Lebanon and the Fourth International and with having organized to "overthrow the political and economic regime" in Egypt and replace it with an "extremist Trotskyist Communist regime."

The latest information is as follows:

The regime issued twenty-one arrest warrants. Sixteen people were arrested and imprisoned, while five of the twenty-one could not be found. One of the sixteen has been released. Ten others have been released on bail and may be arrested again at any time, although no formal charges have been placed against them. Five militants are still being held in prison. They are: Abdel Kazim Shahit Mahmoud and Muzahim Muhi el-Takriti, both of whom are Iraqi teachers; Reda Ibrahim Farag, a student; Mahmoud el-Sayid Muhammed el-Sayid, a worker; and Rashad Mansour Mustafa el-Bedawi, also a worker. These militants are still awaiting formal charges, and a long delay in the disposition of their case is possible, since the government can hold them in prison indefinitely. It is not known what penalties they may face, but a law passed in 1971 provides for sentences of up to life imprisonment for any political activity conducted outside the framework of the Arab Socialist Union, the sole legal party in the country.

The ten militants who have been released provisionally are: Dr. Muhammed Abdu Bayuni, a veterinarian; Ibrahim Abdel Azziz Azzam, a student; Muhammed el-Bashir Abdel Fu'ad el-Sibai, an employee in the Egyptian news agency; Kemal Fu'ad Nagib Muftah; Muhammed Ali Tayil, a student; Muhammed Na'man Hashim Tawfal; Randa Abdel Ghaffar el-Baasi and her brother, Najwa el-Baasi, both students; Ali Mahmoud Khalil, an employee; and Shawki Muhammed Rashad Abdel-Ghanni.

Further, it has been confirmed that Ahmad Nabil el-Hilali, a well-known Egyptian lawyer, is defending the imprisoned militants.

The meaning of the status of the militants under attack in Egypt is contradictory. On the one hand, the fact that some of the comrades have been released, even if only provisionally, shows that the Sadat regime, which is now trying to polish up its "liberal" image, is susceptible to international pressure on the question of political prisoners. On the other hand, the fact that five militants have been held in prison for more than eight months without even being formally charged indicates that the regime may well intend to hold them indefinitely, refusing to risk a political trial but also refusing to release the prisoners. It is thus clear that the fate of the comrades depends on two factors: the internal political situation in Egypt and the degree to which international solidarity is organized in their defense. The latter factor is particularly important in the case of the two Iraqi militants, who could be deported to Iraq, where they would face almost certain death at the hands of the ultra-repressive Baathist regime.

But solidarity is not purely political. Several of the imprisoned militants are workers whose families are deprived of any income as long as they are held in jail. These families are in an extremely difficult financial situation, and aid is needed. Contributions may be sent to Gisela Scholtz, Postal Account Number CCP000-1085001-56, Brussels, Belgium. Notice of contributions should be sent to INPRECOR, 76 rue Antoine Dansaert, Brussels 1000 Belgium.



# THE PRESENT CRISIS IN CHINA

by GREG BENTON



The political crisis presently unfolding in China is essentially a continuation of the cultural revolution, but in a different form. The underlying issues, the lineup of forces at the top, the list of charges leveled by the Maoists — all these are broadly speaking unchanged. Mao's 1966 prophecy that monsters and demons would "jump out" every seven or eight years has thus been fulfilled more or less on time, and the predictions of the bourgeois "China-watchers" have been confounded. And yet, many of the features of the present campaign appear to mark it off decisively from the earlier crisis.

The present Maoist offensive represents the sudden sharpening of a struggle that has rumbled on almost continuously in the top leadership bodies of the party ever since the cultural revolution and has resulted in their repeated decimation. It was triggered by the death of Chou En-lai, whose political weight and talents as a mediator had previously maintained the balance between the competing factions in the leadership.

Despite the polarizing effect of the cultural revolution, the complex pattern of individuals and political groupings in the Chinese Communist party (CCP) leadership still defies any simple classification. Nevertheless, for the purposes of the present analysis one can identify a broadly "radical" and a "conservative" faction. The "radical" faction rose to prominence during the cultural revolution and is the more homogeneous of the two. The more loosely defined "conservative" layer, with the "number two capitalist roader" Teng Hsiao-ping at its center, has tended to hold a more bureaucratic and institutionalizing view of the state. It would be just as

wrong to confuse the Maoist "radicals" with the genuinely anti-bureaucratic forces active in 1966-68 as it would be to accept the characterization of Teng Hsiao-ping as a "bourgeois restorationist."

Mao's original aim in the cultural revolution was to root out his critics from the leadership and wield power through his own "radical" faction. Achievement of this aim was thwarted by the independent evolution of the Red Guard movement and the growth of a rival power base around Lin Biao, Mao's one-time ally, in the central military leadership. As a result, Mao's "radical" alliance was whittled down to its base in sections of the party apparatus, notably in Shanghai, and in parts of the cultural and press establishment. Mao's Bonapartist inclinations automatically ruled out the presence in his political entourage of anyone with genuine independent authority or prestige, whether in China or internationally. This was one more reason why the mass rehabilitation of "pragmatists" like Teng Hsiao-ping became essential after 1972 as the movement to reconstruct the party and administration got underway. Pressure to rehabilitate victims of the cultural revolution and to reduce "radical" influence also came from the regional military commanders, whose power grew considerably during the "mopping-up" stages of the cultural revolution and after.

The resulting marriage of the two factions was a shaky and even unnatural one. Throughout the past three years the two factions have vied with each other for ascendancy, and the bewildering pattern of events has been

complicated still further by the constant rise and fall of the mass movement.

The tenth party congress of August 1973 saw the sudden promotion to number three position (after Mao and Chou) of Wang Hung-wen, the Shanghai leader who had come to prominence as a "radical" after 1966. During the congress Wang raised radical slogans and put renewed emphasis on the role of the mass movement. Wang's slogans were partially implemented during the subsequent "Criticize Lin Biao, Criticize Confucius" campaign. Wall newspapers reported in Western China revealed widespread official corruption and other abuses, and a wave of strikes and demonstrations hit the country.

In January 1975 the National People's Congress met in Peking. The keynote of the congress was unity and stability. "Radical" representation in the bodies set up by the congress was minimal, and Teng Hsiao-ping and his allies took most of the top posts. Mao himself was demonstrably absent. In February 1975 a new campaign was launched to "restrict bourgeois rights," with the clear aim of pre-arranging the political outcome of the National People's Congress. The campaign showed that even if Mao was not in position to prevent the rehabilitation of the "capitalist-roaders," he had absolutely no intention of acquiescing in it. Unlike the nebulous "Criticize Lin Biao, Criticize Confucius" campaign, the new campaign raised inherently subversive issues such as material bureaucratic privileges, the presence of "bourgeois power-holders" in the leadership, and so on. Recent events confirm the suspicion that Teng Hsiao-ping was a main target of the campaign. In the second half of 1975, after a renewed eruption of strikes and illegal mass organization in various parts of China, the campaign clearly lost momentum and the slogan of "unity and stability" was raised. Teng Hsiao-ping, by now a member of the standing committee of the Political Bureau, party vice-chairman, army chief-of-staff, and permanent stand-in for the dying Chou En-lai, appeared more and more certain to take over as prime minister when the time came.

The announcement on February 8, 1976, that Hua Kuo-feng had been appointed acting premier, Chou's old post, therefore created a sensation. Hua's appointment had all the appearances of a compromise. He has no national power base. He is not known as a "radical," and during the cultural revolution he came under ferocious attack from the far-left Sheng-wu-lien group in Hunan. Since Hua is minister of public security, his appointment may also represent a warning to would-be "trouble-makers" among the rank and file.

Four days later, a press and wall-newspaper campaign began. Although as of this writing Teng has not yet been officially named, he is unmistakably the target of the offensive. The charges against Teng and the "rightists" include:

\*Launching an "economic typhoon" to "put economics first" or on a par with politics. On February 17 People's Daily accused the "capitalist-roaders" of "put-

ting on the same footing (1) the study of the theory of the dictatorship of the proletariat to combat and prevent revisionism, (2) the promotion of stability and unity and (3) the development of the national economy" (referred to as "taking the three instructions as the link");

\*Sowing discord between the party and intellectuals and advocating that "scientific and technical units should be led by experts," that the purpose of universities is to "train cadres and technicians," and that "a good scholar makes an official" (People's Daily February 13);

\*Reversing previous decisions, opposing the rapid ascent of young people, and recruiting personnel "without inquiring into the political and historical situation of the person to be appointed and his or her attitude towards the cultural revolution";

\*Proposing the widening of the wage-scale from eight to twelve grades;

\*Wanting reconciliation with the Kremlin;

\*Opposing Mao's principle that "the party should command the army and not vice versa."



## Chou & Teng

Other charges allege that Teng's self-criticisms after the cultural revolution were not sincere, that he organized the 1975 National People's Congress against Mao's wishes, that he attempted to suppress the news that Wang Hung-wen was vice-chairman of the party military commission, that he obtained "black material" to use against Chiang Ching (Mao's wife), and that he has advocated class cooperation and capitulation ever since the anti-Japanese war of resistance.

On February 29 People's Daily accused the "capitalist-roaders" (openly referred to as a "faction" rather than a "tiny handful") of "unscrupulously splitting the central committee" and warned that they wield "very great

power" in the party. Clearly, powerful forces are ranged behind Teng, not only in Peking but also in the provinces. The "rightist" formula of "taking the three instructions as the link" was used extensively in local agricultural conferences in late 1975 (although Hua Kuo-feng avoided using it in his own important speech on agricultural development). Wall newspapers in the provinces have reportedly broadened the attack to include local leaders. In the absence of retreats or compromises, the fighting could therefore easily engulf wide areas of the country.

In such a situation, the role of the army would be decisive. The army, traditionally firmly subordinate to a unified political leadership, split as a result of the cultural revolution and was drawn into the factional vortex. During and after the crushing of the Lin Piao group, the regional commanders acquired unprecedented power and influence. The experience of the cultural revolution, together with the inherent conservatism of the military hierarchy, gave these commanders a natural inclination toward an alliance with the "conservative" pragmatists in the leadership. Recently the Shanghai party has energetically pushed the idea of a "workers militia" as a counterweight to this alliance, with varying degrees of success. A reshuffling of the regional commands has partly reduced the political influence of the military, but it is still significantly greater than in other workers states and could quickly re-emerge as an independent factor in the political situation. The fact that the principle of party control over the army has been raised as an issue in the present campaign may therefore have ominous implications for the future evolution of the power struggle.

The exact role of Chou En-lai in the present crisis has yet to be clarified. The March 2, 1976, *Le Monde* reported posters in Canton criticizing Chou for having favored Teng Hsiao-ping's rehabilitation. After Chou's death, the Japanese *Sankei Shimbun* published a remarkable document (subsequently reported by Tass on January 29) purporting to be Chou's "political testament"; copies were allegedly distributed to members of the Central Committee by Chou's wife, Teng Ying-chao. The main points of the document were: China's diplomacy should be based on proletarian internationalism and it should cooperate but not ally with capitalist countries. The party should observe the principle of democratic management "and never again make mistakes like the cultural revolution." The economy should be managed by specialists; the emphasis should be placed on heavy industry, and the "workers, peasants, and intellectuals must be clearly aware of their mission."

Recently many important documents initially made public outside China have been shown to be authentic. If Chou's testament is also genuine, it shows support for Teng's conceptions. The implications of the document are that Mao's present critics, like all his past opponents, also differ with him on relations with imperialism and the Soviet Union. It seems likely that the "radical" wing of the bureaucracy on domestic matters is often rightist on foreign affairs and the "conservative" wing

is more prepared to consider united action with the Soviet Union. It is difficult to gauge the impact on the Chinese masses of the victories in Vietnam and Angola. The Chinese masses, of course, are kept in great ignorance on international questions. But it is hard to believe that these stunning reverses for Mao's line will not have some reverberations in the current political crisis in China. (On this point, see the revised English edition of Livio Maitan's book *Party, Army, and Masses in China*, New Left Books, London. On Chinese foreign policy, see articles in *INPRECOR*, Nos. 2, 5/6, 20, and 37.) What is probably being reflected is an increasing awareness on the part of sections of the leadership of the sterility of a line that designates the Soviet Union as "the main enemy," which has nothing to do with the charges against these elements that they "preach recourse to foreign aid" and "favor imperialist or social-imperialist type modernization." (*People's Daily*, February 29.)

In domestic policy, the main charge against the "rightists" is that they favor professionalism as against class struggle. Similar charges have been leveled at other leaders in the past. Linked to the question of "professionalism" is the alleged proposal for a slight widening of wage differentials. (Note, however, that in autumn 1975 Teng readily associated himself with attacks on



high salaries for top state officials.) Despite the one-sidedness of the present "debate" and the improbability of many of the allegations, these two particular charges have the ring of truth.

The background to this policy dispute is the ambitious modernization program announced by Chou En-lai in 1975, which in principle appears to enjoy the support of all sections of the leadership. The implementation of such a program would place tremendous strains on a country as poor and underdeveloped as China, all the more so if the present unfavorable evolution of the terms of China's world trade continues. It will also involve wage freezes and curbs on consumption in a period of rapidly rising output, a situation that breeds resentment and led in 1974-75 to strike movements across China. Obviously, inequality, privilege, corruption, and other symptoms of bureaucratic degeneration will exacerbate this contradiction and threaten the stability of society, as the cultural revolution showed.

Mao's instinctive response to the deepening mood of unrest in the country was to launch the 1973-75 campaigns in an attempt to limit bureaucratic abuses somewhat. The proposals of Mao's opponents in the leadership are more classically Stalinist: to allow small increases in differentials and thus to create a narrow privileged layer to act as a cushion between the rule of the bureaucracy and the masses. Such proposals would be warmly welcomed by the lower-level bureaucrats, who were cowed and demoralized by the cultural revolution and were frequently accused of deserting their posts in the face of mass pressure during the recent campaigns.

The Maoist offensive against the "professionalist" principle has resulted in the partial re-emergence of various forms of workers control in Chinese industry. Throughout the early 1970s press reports spoke of rank-and-file resistance to moves to "strengthen business management" and restore factory discipline. During the 1975 campaign, after the "radical" leaders had urged the workers to "occupy the superstructures," workers' inspection teams were revived in Shanghai and elsewhere. On February 10, 1976, the Yugoslav press agency Tanjug reported the formation of "workers control teams," although it made clear that such bodies had no real power over production plans or income distribution.

Tight party control is apparently a common feature of all aspects of the present campaign. The formation of mass struggle organizations has so far been expressly forbidden. Red Flag (February 1976) called for the "strengthening of party leadership, so that the mass debate will develop in a planned manner, step by step." BBC-monitored reports from Wuhan (February 9) revealed that "since the debate began there has been no halting of classes or production, no organizing of liaison visits, and no erecting of mountain-strongholds during the movement."

The marked totalitarian bias in recent campaigns contrasts sharply with the classical Maoist themes of equality and participation. The same Mao who in 1966 in-

spired the Red Guards with rhetorical references to the Paris Commune now eulogizes Chin Shih Huang, China's ruthless first unifier and a practitioner of the reactionary philosophy of legalism. Here Mao stands clearly to the right of his opponents, who despite their hostility to proletarian democracy favor a certain measure of liberalization and differentiation in political, intellectual, and cultural life. (Since Chiang Ching lost her grip on cultural policy in 1973, many hundreds of new books and periodicals have been published, for the first time in several years.)



## Hua

Will the present crisis deepen into a new cultural revolution, and will the Maoists establish their ascendancy in the leadership? The balance of forces at the top today is even more heavily weighted against the "radicals" than it was in 1966; without Mao's personal intervention the present campaign would never have got started. Wide sections of the leadership were traumatized by the cultural revolution, and Mao can no longer count on the automatic support of the military. (On this point see "Behind the 'Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius' Campaign," INPRECOR, No. 10, October 17, 1974.)

But since Maoism has always drawn its strength from the mass movement, in the struggle both for state power and for power in the party, is this not therefore an argument for Mao's initiating a new cultural revolution? Here a crucial new factor in the situation must be taken into consideration. The course of recent events indicates that the relationship between Maoism and the mass movement has changed qualitatively, and that ever wider

sections of Chinese society are prepared to break from the orbit of all wings of the bureaucracy and to strike out for their own independent interests.

First, many of the recent campaign themes originated in the unofficial movement (see Western press reports for June 1974), where they were raised with a boldness and immediacy only distantly reflected in the official versions.

Second, whereas working class political or strike action in past years has invariably developed in the shadow of the student movement or one or another section of the bureaucracy, the strike wave of 1974-75 was remarkable for its apparent independence from all outside influences. As in 1967, official denunciations of "syndicalism" reveal the emergence of independent trade-union-type bodies during these struggles. But while the 1967 Shanghai strike wave was defused by a combination of political persuasion by the Maoist leadership and internal divisions within the mass movement itself, the 1975 Hangchow crisis was ended only by the sending of 10,000 troops under Teng Hsiao-ping, after an unsuccessful attempt at political mediation by Wang Hung-wen. (Hangchow workers are clearly using the present campaign to vent their hatred for Teng. According to the February 28 *Le Monde*, the attacks on him in the city have reached an "astonishing volume.") The growth in worker-peasant representation in leading party and state bodies since 1969 could acquire more than just token significance if independent mass action increases.

The growing maturity and self-confidence of the Chinese working class is partly rooted in the rapid socio-economic development of the country. The evident disenchantment with Mao's narrow conception of the anti-bureaucratic struggles springs from the failure of the cultural revolution to fulfill expectations, the seemingly unending series of cynical power struggles in the leadership, the growing secrecy and exclusiveness of the political "debate," and Mao's obvious inability to hit upon a "radical" successor of any real stature in the country. At the same time, the partial relaxation of foreign military pressure on China has probably encouraged the process of internal differentiation. But recent events show that the chairman is still capable of responding to and stimulating the mass movement in a way unique among established ruling groups.

Predictions about the course of Chinese politics are notoriously difficult, doubly so since the thought of "going to meet Marx" could easily embolden Mao to make some last dramatic gesture to confound his opponents. But for the reasons given above it seems that the campaign will remain more or less within official channels, particularly since the price of military intervention to restore order would almost certainly be an even further reduction of "radical" representation at the top.

This explains why the present campaign is coming to a climax so quickly compared with the slow, step-by-

step buildup of the anti-Liu campaign during the cultural revolution. Whereas the latter involved a genuine, although narrowly conceived, mobilization at the base, the former has up to now been strictly regulated from above. The official press has also broadly hinted that the door is still open for yet another "recantation" by the recidivist Teng, thus allowing for a retreat from all-out confrontation.

Where does the erosion of their mass base leave the Maoists? The measures Mao is now proposing to combat "capitalist restoration" include theoretical study, "all-round dictatorship" (which means in practice the extinction of all elements of proletarian democracy), and the preparation of a handful of close confidants (including his wife and son-in-law) to succeed him — measures which, where not illusory, are downright reactionary in essence. But if a convulsion of the proportions of the cultural revolution failed to achieve this aim, then the present campaign is even more clearly doomed.



The inability of the leadership to resolve or even substantially alleviate the contradictions of Chinese society revealed by the cultural revolution is now beyond all dispute. The political struggle that has broken out so soon after the death of Chou En-lai has so far remained largely on the level of the bureaucracy. The death of Mao, however, will signal the end of a historical period and will lead eventually to an explosion of pent-up social tensions. In such a situation, the emergence of groups and sectors of society mobilized independently of the bureaucracy will be of decisive importance.

March 10, 1976

# BALANCE-SHEET OF THE FIRST CONGRESS OF THE CUBAN COMMUNIST PARTY

by LIVIO MAITAN

A party congress can be an occasion for making a turn or for launching a political initiative. On the other hand, it can also be an occasion for drawing up a balance-sheet and for systematization. The first congress of the Cuban Communist party was clearly of the second variety. Fidel Castro himself stressed this when he hailed the fortunate timing of the congress.(1) Hence, neither the documents nor the discussions at the congress brought forth any new elements to suggest any revisions in the views expressed previously.(2) Nevertheless, the general outlook of the Cuban Communist party now appears in a more organic form, with all its features better defined. It is thus worthwhile to examine some points in a synthetic manner.

## Historical context and the nature of the revolution

Fidel began his long report with a historical excursion during which he established the links between the revolution of 1959 and the struggle for independence during the past century and the correspondence between the thought of Lenin and that of José Martí. In drawing these parallels, he did not introduce any ambiguity about the character of the revolution. He said:

"Our struggle necessarily had to go beyond a purely national character and potential and had to link its fate to the world revolutionary movement. The domination of the richest and most powerful imperialist power could not be resisted solely with the strength of a small and isolated country. At the same time, with the development of capitalism in our country and the emergence of the working class, the content of our revolution, which under colonialism could not go beyond the limits of a national liberation movement inspired by the liberal principles of the past century, necessarily had to move toward a social revolution as well. The task of liberating the nation from imperialist domination was now indissolubly united with the task of liquidating the

exploitation of man by man within our society. Both objectives were inseparable parts of our historical process, since the capitalist system, which oppressed us as a nation from outside, also oppressed and exploited us as workers inside the country, and the social force that was able to liberate the country from oppression internally, that is, the workers themselves, was the only force that could sustain us on the external plane against the imperialist power oppressing the nation."

In other words, Castro highlighted the permanent character of the revolution, with no concessions to the theory of the revolution by stages in either of its two forms.

At the same time, Castro placed the Cuban revolutionary process in its real sociopolitical context, delivering a *coup de grâce* to the false or one-sided interpretations symbolized by the 1967 essay by Régis Debray, "Revolution in the Revolution." Castro recalled some precedents that were later to operate in depth, such as how the insurrectional general strike of August 1933 brought down the Machado dictatorship and led to the formation of "revolutionary soviets" in some of the centers of sugar production, and he recalled Cuba's internationalist traditions, again from the 1930s, evidenced by the approximately 1,000 Cubans who went to fight in Republican Spain. He returned to the origins and formation of the leading group of the July 26 Movement, some of the components of which were broadly influenced by Marxism-Leninism because of the continuity assured at the time by the youth and student cells organized in the Partido Socialista Popular (PSP — Popular Socialist party, the name of the old, Stalinist Cuban Communist party).(3) He forcefully confirmed the role of the working class in the final phase of the revolution. ("Our workers and peasants, integrated into the Rebel Army, with the support of the middle layers, pulverized the tyranny, destroyed the armed apparatus of oppression, and won the full independence of the fatherland. With its revolutionary general strike during the final battle, the working class made a decisive con-



a series of bourgeois and petty-bourgeois national revolutionary movements that were to have a very broad mass influence for a rather long period. In Cuba this policy left an opening for the July 26 Movement, whose original character was not different, and for its victorious struggle.

The absence of this element in Castro's historical synthesis thus constitutes a serious deformation from the standpoint of analysis; from the political standpoint it is a concession to the old leading group of the PSP and even more so to the bureaucracy of the USSR, which was principally responsible, through the Stalinized Comintern, for the decline and sterilization of the indigenous Latin American Communist movement. Castro's silence about the events around the Annibal Escalante affair and his negative presentation of the trade-union congress of 1966, which in fact marked an important stage in the battle against the old, bureaucratized leading group, have a similar significance.

tribution to the victory.") He indicated that the relatively favorable international context was a precondition for the victory, on the one hand because of imperialism's failure to understand the potential of the struggle under way in Cuba, and on the other hand because of the ability the USSR had acquired to act as a counterweight to North American imperialism.

Castro's historical excursion certainly corresponded to his aim, which was to synthesize all the factors and their interconnections that had prepared the revolution and made its victory possible. But in at least one basic respect history was altered through a series of significant omissions.

First, after correctly noting that Baliño and Mella had an adequate understanding of the character of the revolution at the time of the founding of the Communist party (1925), Castro remained completely silent about the subsequent deviations of the CP, including the sectarian and adventurist ones typical of the third period, which weighed heavily in the events of 1933. Nor did he say a word about the subsequent right turns that were to make the Cuban Communist party one of the forerunners of Browderite revisionism, organize a bloc with Batista in 1939, and later participate in the Batista government during the 1940s. (He limited himself to a fleeting allusion to the "tactical alliances with the left" promised by the dictator.) Consequently, in a completely one-sided manner he attributed the isolation of the PSP solely to the fact that for a long period, especially during the cold war, it was the main target of the bourgeoisie and imperialism and paid the price for the anticommunist mystification to which broad sectors of the masses were subject. In other words, Castro forgot the fundamental point: The Cuban Communists (who were applying the Stalinist themes of popular and anti-fascist fronts) were in large measure thrust to the sidelines because of their collaboration with sectors of the ruling class and, in the final analysis, with Yankee imperialism itself. It was precisely this policy of the Latin American Communist parties that left big openings for

In truth, this tendentious rewriting of history is intermeshed with a self-critical rewriting of a whole series of positions that had been taken during the early years of the revolution for which the leadership is now attempting to find a common denominator. (We would suppose that this is pleasing to the talmudists of various bureaucracies, who had put forward similar arguments at the height of some of the antibureaucratic battles of the Fidelista group, not without provoking, as Castro himself indicated in his replies, more than a few negative reactions from the Cubans.) According to Castro, both during the phase of the struggle against Batista and during the period following the victory of the revolution, there were a series of deviations that may be characterized as "self-sufficiency" and "overestimation," caused by "the germ of chauvinism and the petty-bourgeois spirit" typical of those who took to "the road of revolution through purely intellectual paths." The most serious consequence of these positions, according to the report, was that "from the very beginning the Cuban revolution was unable to take advantage of the rich experience of other peoples in the realm of the building of socialism, peoples who had taken this road well before we did."

That the Castroist group was of petty-bourgeois origin and therefore corresponded to other similar Latin American movements is a fundamental fact that is difficult to dispute. We may say in passing that this origin explains both some of the ideological motivations and political positions of the first phase of the revolution and the lack of reference to Marxism-Leninism, whereas the explanation advanced by Castro at the congress, which was that this was a deliberate tactical ruse, is rather less compelling. It is also incontestable that those who come to the revolution solely through intellectual development are particularly exposed to the danger of deformation, and not only in a country like Cuba. And it is true that right from the beginning the Cuban leaders did not try sufficiently to assimilate the experiences of other countries, making the necessary distinction between basic historical tendencies and the effects of specific factors.

On the other hand, it is not correct to adhere to or encourage interpretations that consider the various battles fought by the Cuban leadership against bureaucratic criteria and methods in the building of the transitional society and against the opportunist degeneration of the Communist parties to be petty-bourgeois deformations. When Castro launched his indictment against Stalinist-style historical falsification; when, in denouncing Escalante, he hit upon the concrete mechanisms of a tendency toward bureaucratization, even if only empirically; when, even while justifying the invasion of Czechoslovakia, he exposed the responsibility of a bureaucratic leadership; when the Cuban CP rejected the method of the democratic road to socialism and the perspective of compromise with the bourgeoisie on the basis of the strategy of the Latin American CPs; when Che Guevara affirmed that the real choice was socialist revolution or caricature of revolution, the Cuban leaders were not succumbing to petty-bourgeois influences, but were instead acting on the basis of an analysis of real phenomena and were posing a perspective of revolutionary struggle for socialism from the standpoint of intransigent defense of the interests of the working class.

### **Economic rectification and "poder popular"**

The economic self-criticism, dramatically initiated at the time of the failure of the ten-million ton sugar harvest in 1970, reached a plateau with the reports and resolutions on the system of management and planning.

It is hardly necessary to recall that such self-criticism has an objective basis. Incontestably, during the early years of the revolution there was a definite flourishing of tendencies and orientations of a utopian character, at the root of which was the conviction that stages could be skipped and that elements of communism could begin to be introduced. (*Mutatis mutandis*, this error was analogous to that made by the Bolshevik leaders in their initial interpretation of war communism.) The present positions, however, are broadly influenced by the "models" of the USSR and the bureaucratized workers states closest to the USSR. The very choice of priorities moves in this direction, despite the fact that the formula "greater attention to agriculture" and "major emphasis on industrialization" (a bit in the Chinese style!) attempts to maintain an overall balance. "During the next five years," Castro said, "the process of industrialization of the country will accelerate considerably."

At the same time, the congress approved the adoption of a new system of management whose features were synthesized as follows:

"The system being proposed takes great account of the economic laws that reign during the period of the construction of socialism and that exist independent of our will and desires. Among these laws is the law of value, the necessity of all the enterprises, including the state



enterprises, to maintain relations of income and expenditure and the necessity that in these relations and in general in the various relations that are generated in the economy, taxes, credits, interest, and the other market categories function as indispensable instruments in governing the use to which we put our productive resources and in determining to the last detail, to the last centavo, how much we are spending on everything we produce, in order to be able to decide which investments are most beneficial, to be able to judge which enterprises, which units, and which collectives are work-





ing best and which are working worst and to be able to take the appropriate measures."

The resolution also seeks to offer a response to the greatest problems posed for a planned economy, from the problem of determining prices to problems of management of the enterprises and incentives.

It is sufficient to note that in their concern to rehabilitate "objective economic laws" and to avoid falling into the previously proclaimed utopian idea of elimi-

nating the law of value, the Cubans seem to err in the opposite direction, making an overly sweeping use of the category "monetary-market relations."<sup>(4)</sup> As far as incentives are concerned, an effort was made to combine moral and material incentives, while on the other hand the system of production norms was reaffirmed. The adoption of such norms was not new, but their application has been slowed down by various obstacles. (At present, 48 percent of the work force work under production norms; 20 percent are paid according to piece work; significant productivity increases have been registered in a series of sectors.)<sup>(5)</sup>

Finally, in the administration of the enterprises, "single responsibility linked to a collective leadership" was affirmed as the basic principle. The director, who is the supreme authority, will be designated by higher bodies and "advised" by a leadership council in which the trade-union organizations will be represented. The participation of the workers in the leadership on questions such as discussion of the economic plan, the analysis of the results achieved, the utilization of the incentive funds, the tasks of socialist emulation, and so on, will be assured "by various methods and in various forms." In this area as well, then, the choice of the Cuban leadership is rather close to the Soviet "model" and quite different from the Yugoslav "model," for example.

The idea that the revolution has entered the phase of institutionalization was the central theme of an entire section of Castro's report and of the resolution on the organs of popular power. Many of the themes that have been broached during recent years were taken up again and certain central concepts were reaffirmed. At the same time, the stages of the application of the decisions that have been made were fixed. One important stipulation was that at least two candidates must be presented in each district during elections, with a second-round vote in the event that no candidate wins a majority in the first round.

There will be some transference of functions as the process of institutionalization takes effect. In particular, the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution will no longer have to fulfill "tasks that are by nature partially of a state character."

## Problems of the party

On the question of the function of the party in transitional society, the congress more or less repeated formulas that have already been used in various documents during past years. For example, the resolution on popular power affirms that "the organs of popular power are the highest state authority in the areas in which they exercise jurisdiction and carry out the tasks of public administration. The party will orient, impulse, and control the tasks of the state organs, will control the policy of promotion and training of cadres and will work to perfect the mechanisms of the state, but must never supplant the powers and functions of these mechanisms." For his part, Castro, referring to the mass or-

ganizations, declared: "They are the link that assures the closest ties of the party to the broad masses."

Beyond the details of this or that formulation, the basic concept is that of the primacy of the party in the transitional society; in practice, this is guaranteed by the very mechanisms of institutionalization, by the composition of the apparatus, and by the clear predominance of party members in the leadership of society, a predominance that becomes virtually exclusive as one moves up in the hierarchy.(6)

The congress confirmed the concept of the party as the vanguard and sanctioned the peculiar method of recruitment whereby all candidates for party membership are subject to the evaluation of their work mates. Nonetheless, masses of members have been taken into the party rapidly, the total membership rising from 50,000 in 1965 to about 100,000 in 1970 to 186,000 in 1974 and 202,807 at the end of September of last year. Castro himself exhibited some concern over the social composition of the party, which, according to the statistics presented at the congress, is as follows: 52% of party members belong to cells "in the work centers of agriculture and livestock, industry, and construction," 7.5% to cells in education, and 3% to cells in the health system, while nearly 40% fulfill "functions of political or administrative leadership." This last factor is significant, and its importance is not diminished by Castro's observation that "the great majority of comrades working on tasks of political leadership or in administrative activities are of working-class origin." Experience has demonstrated only too often that working-class origin in itself is not at all sufficient to prevent bureaucratic degeneration: The conditioning determined by the new position is far more decisive than the conditioning determined by the original position.(7)

We do not possess all the elements needed for an overall evaluation of the conduct of the pre-congress discussion and of the work of the congress itself. The leadership emphasized the very large number of people — both inside and outside the party — who had participated in the discussion of the draft resolutions and the text of the new constitution. There were criticisms and dissent, but we do not know to what extent. For example, 6,200,000 people were said to have participated in the discussion on the constitution, of whom 5,500,000 were said to have voted in favor of the text unconditionally, while 16,000, supported by a total of 600,000, are said to have proposed modifications or amendments. In the discussion of the document on the agrarian question, 212,000 peasants voted in favor, 901 against, and 228 abstained. In the big popular assembly at the end of the congress, which was described as the largest ever held, Castro once again resorted to his outright plebiscitary method, with the predictable result that everyone voted for the decisions of the congress; nobody voted against and there were no abstentions.

The congresses of the various party bodies seem to have been pretty much occasions for rubber-stamping decisions and for asserting confidence in the major leaders.

As for the national congress, in itself it was an eloquent indication of the degree to which workers are involved. Castro's report took up the entire first day and half of the second, while the remainder of the second day was largely reserved for greetings to the congress and various ceremonies. There were only four interventions: from a hero of labor in the cane fields, a member of the leadership of Pinar del Río, an administrator of a nickel factory, and the poet Nicolas Guillen. The third day was taken up by the work of the commissions. During the first part of the fourth day, apart from additional greetings, there were five interventions, the speakers being chosen on the basis of the same criteria as were applied on the second day. The voting on various resolutions began on the afternoon of the fourth day and continued on the fifth day. Then the congress concluded with a summary by Castro. It is only too clear that the sole purpose of the congress was to officially ratify what had already been decided and worked out in all details.

#### SOME FACTS ABOUT CUBA (according to congress documents)

Population: 6,763,061 according to 1958 census;  
9,296,068 according to 1975 census.

Work force: Increased by 1 million (58.5%) between 1959 and 1969.

#### Composition of work force:

Cane-cutters: 1975: 180,000 (half of the prerevolutionary period)  
Sugar refining and processing: 1970: 120,000  
1975: 89,000  
Machine industry: 1959: 4,000  
1975: 29,000  
Textile and shoe industry: 1959: 14,000  
1975: 15,395  
Tobacco industry: 1975: 49,672  
Construction workers: 1958: 83,000  
1975: 275,000  
Teaching and health: 1975: 400,000  
Administrative officials: 1975: 200,000

Countryside: State sector: 70%  
Private sector: 30%  
Members of ANAP (the association of small peasants): 232,358, of whom 162,126 are owners of family farms.  
Tractors: 1958: 9,000  
1975: 54,000

Education: Overall number of students:  
1958: 811,345  
1975: 3,051,000

Party membership: 1965: 50,000 (approximate)  
1970: 100,000 (approximate)  
1974: 186,995  
1975: 202,807

The decisive ideological influence of the Soviet bureaucracy comes through in various documents. In addition, Castro explained that "many cadres and functionaries of the party" in charge of the cadre schools had been trained in the USSR, others in East Germany or Bulgaria. We will not return to what we have already said elsewhere: Point by point, the report on ideological struggle took up the themes and style that have now become customary, with a virtually Zhdanov-like flavor, with stereotypic polemics against "rightist and leftist revisionists," the alleged identity of whom is regularly denounced.

In his conclusions and in his speech to the mass rally, Castro used some arguments and tones in which a sense of unease could perhaps be detected, as though he feared he would be accused of nepotism. He was concerned with justifying the elevation of his brother Raúl to the second position in the hierarchy, claiming that the promotion was a consequence of Raúl's genuine merits. At the same time, he prepared to defend himself against possible criticism of a "personality cult," on the one hand by proclaiming that with the process of institutionalization individual men would have a less important function and that the danger of an excessive concentration of power would thus be countered more effectively, on the other hand by denying the very concept of individual genius. ("Among humanity, properly speaking, geniuses do not exist. There are brilliant men. But genius does not exist in these individuals; genius exists in the masses.") Thus, he insisted on explaining that the existing unanimity was not the result of "mechanical discipline," but was instead due to the fact that the documents had been widely discussed and altered in some cases. Finally, he exclaimed significantly: "This revolution has not devoured, and will never devour, its own sons."

It can be assumed that this outburst was not pleasing to the bureaucratic delegations present. The Soviet bureaucrats in particular must at least have been moved to think that it would have been better not to have spoken of the rope in the house of the hanged.

## International policy and Angola

The congress ratified the international policy based on adherence to the theses of the Soviet bureaucrats; this was also extended to more specific positions (on India, Sri Lanka, and Bangladesh, for example). A series of self-criticisms were made (on the attitude Cuba adopted during the October crisis of 1962, and more generally, its attitude during an entire phase of the revolution). The desire to collaborate with the so-called nonaligned countries was confirmed, regardless of the social structures and political regimes of these countries. For Latin America, the analytical underpinnings of the orientation of the past several years were confirmed, that is, that "in Latin America today there are no immediate prospects for overall changes that would lead, as in Cuba, to sudden social transformations." This orienta-

tion has been recently concretized in initiatives directed toward Mexico and Panama, whose top leaders were triumphally received in Cuba. Such initiatives have not been limited to the diplomatic realm or to equally legitimate support to specific positions taken by the regimes in question; instead they have taken on a more general scope, entering into contradiction with the interests of the workers movements in the countries concerned. To give just two examples: The Cuban press has presented López Portillo, the ruling party's candidate for president in Mexico, in a favorable light, without bothering about the different position that has been taken by the Mexican Communists, who are presenting their own candidate; the Cuban leadership has also associated itself with the campaign the Panamanian government is waging to denigrate the revolutionary students and organizations like the *Fracción Socialista Revolucionaria* (Revolutionary Socialist Faction), which are not inclined to overlook the bourgeois character of the Torrijos regime.(8)

But during the time of the congress itself, Cuban policy was subjected to important tests. For some time there had been much talk of Cuba's desire to reach a compromise with the United States, and some people, falling into hasty impressionism, had drawn the conclusion that the Cuban leaders were prepared to pay a very high price for such a compromise. It is now clear, however, that they were not prepared to pay the price of renouncing their courageous attitude of internationalist solidarity. This had already been indicated by their position in support of independence for Puerto Rico. The intervention in Angola confirmed it brilliantly. Cuba's decisive commitment to a crucial anti-imperialist battle has few precedents in the history of past decades, and whatever the particular tactical reasons for the intervention may have been, it remains exemplary testimony to revolutionary internationalism.(9)

## Problems in perspective

If all the elements are considered, if account is taken of the economic advances registered during past years and of the political expectations created by the process of institutionalization, and if it is noted that the leading group has succeeded in preserving its own prestige among the broad masses, it is legitimate to predict relative stability for a certain period. But this does not mean that a series of tensions and contradictions do not exist, tensions and contradictions that in the long run could rise to the surface or could even explode if certain problems remain unsolved or are solved inadequately.

Limiting ourselves to a few brief points, we may say that economic development continues to face serious problems. As we have pointed out elsewhere, the 6% growth rate called for in the five-year plan is insufficient for a country that is still in large measure underdeveloped. Castro has explicitly said that more modest rates will have to be set than those of previous years. The spectacular oscillation of the price of sugar on the

world market will continue to represent a serious unbalancing factor. (After rising to a peak of US\$.60 a pound at the end of 1974, the price of sugar fell to US\$.14 a pound in the course of several months.)

Politically, the major problem is that of the real content of institutionalization. The previously existing vacuum had been one of the major factors fostering the emergence and crystallization of a layer of functionaries and administrators appropriating the main tasks of management and leadership. Will institutionalization introduce a radical change, with direct participation of the masses, or, on the contrary, will it be limited to providing a new formal framework for the already existing middle and higher layers of administrators? The answer to this question in practice will in large measure determine the future development of the revolution, will determine whether or not Cuba will suffer a bureaucratic degeneration.

Similarly, only practice will be able to determine the precise content of certain formulas on the relation between the party and the institutions of popular power and between the party and the mass organizations. A Soviet- or Chinese-style application of the primacy of the party would make regression inevitable in the long run.

In particular, tensions may arise in the management and leadership of the economic enterprises. The formulas that have been adopted have hierarchical tendencies, and their application in practice will probably entail conflicts between the leadership personnel and the worker rank and file over which side will exert the greatest weight.

As has happened in China, problems may also arise from what has been one of the major conquests of the revolution, the enormous increase in the level of education. Bottlenecks and dangerous imbalances may arise over the role to be played by graduates. And above all, the increases in cultural needs and the ever more massive advent of new generations for whom the importance of comparisons with prerevolutionary conditions is gradually declining will wind up introducing contradictory elements in the ideological monolithism and practices of unanimity that have been prevalent up to now.

Finally, in the realm of international policy, differentiations may arise in face of concrete choices that sharply pose the implications of certain theories and orientations. In particular, the policy of unconditional support to the so-called revolutionary nationalist regimes of Latin America, with the abandoning of the revolutionaries of these countries, will sooner or later stimulate critical reflection that could explode to the surface when important events take place.

For all these reasons, the overall historic balance-sheet of the first congress of the Cuban Communist party, despite its genuine importance, is far from definitive.

February 22, 1976

## FOOTNOTES:

1. Fortunate because the seventeen years that have elapsed since the seizure of power have permitted errors to be overcome and maturity to be acquired. It should be obvious that this argument cannot justify such a long delay in holding a congress; the practical consequence of the delay has been that during this long period fundamental decisions have been made by a rather small number of people.

2. For our evaluation, see the article that appeared in *Quatrième Internationale*, No. 22.

3. In an August 22, 1975, speech Castro had presented a piece of autobiographical information, recalling that he had bought his first Marxist-Leninist books in the CP bookstore on Calle Carlos III.

4. The resolution speaks of "market relations among enterprises." It seems to forget that in a planned economy with nationalized industry the means of production are no longer commodities and thus the exchange relationships between the enterprises that produce them and those that acquire them are no longer determined by the law of value (which law does not disappear during the phase of transition, but whose field of action steadily narrows).

5. The following statistics on wages were presented at the congress: The average monthly wage is 136 pesos, an increase of 21% compared with the 1970 average. The mean income per family is 203 pesos. Fifty percent of families have only one wage earner; 30% have two; 12% have three; and 1.8% have more than three.

6. An interesting fact: 85 percent of the officers in the army are members of the party or of the Communist youth organization.

7. The percentages among the congress delegates indicate the danger even more clearly, in spite of Castro's claim that there was no attempt to organize a "meeting of leaders." Thirty percent of the delegates were political leaders; 19% were administrative cadres; 19% were officials in the defense and security forces; 35% were militants working in production, education, and services. Participation by women was limited: About 15% of the delegates (and of party members) were women.

8. See, for example, the October 5, 1975, issue of *Granma*, the official organ of the Cuban Communist party. The Cuban congress also ratified the document of the conference of Latin American Communist parties held in June 1975. In various respects, this document represented a compromise between the Cuban conceptions and the traditional conceptions of the leading groups of the Communist parties. Let us take this opportunity to indicate our disagreement with the interpretation of the June 1975 conference advanced in the article by Pablo Rojas published in the November 20, 1975, issue of *INPRECOR* (No. 38).

9. The congress did not speak of China (or Albania), except to make fleeting reference to China's differences with Cuba. On the other hand, a rather vigorous polemic was waged in the press against the shameful Maoist position on Angola.

# ANGOLA:

# I.

**1** The formation of an independent state in Angola is the outcome of a political and military struggle waged by many social and political forces. In spite of the existence of an anticolonialist tradition and the scope of the forces mobilized in the armed confrontation, the struggle went on for fourteen years, because of the following specific factors:

a) Portuguese imperialism's interest in controlling the very considerable resources of the country, especially since it could not seriously rely on a neocolonial reconversion because of its economic and political weakness;

b) the necessity for the fascist regime in Lisbon to maintain its colonial empire or suffer the breakdown of the overall sociopolitical equilibrium on which it was based;

c) the presence in Angola of a significant contingent of colons who were propelled by their racial interests and privileges to defend the traditional colonial structures to the very end;

d) the character of the Angolan socioeconomic structure, which was more developed than that of the other Portuguese colonies, which implied more substantial potential for a dynamic of permanent revolution;

e) the absence of a national bourgeoisie of any degree of solidity;

f) the difficulty for the United States to play the card of neocolonialism at the expense of the old colonial power and to contribute to a relatively peaceful reconversion; this was a result both of Washington's politico-military links with the Lisbon regime in the framework of the Atlantic Pact (which involved aid to the Portuguese army) and of the U.S. desire not to endanger the political equilibrium of the Iberian peninsula (the events following April 25, 1974, confirmed just how well founded this concern was from the standpoint of the imperialists).

**2** In the course of the war, transformations occurred that accentuated the weight of some of these factors and, in the final analysis, reduced imperialism's political maneuvering room. In the countryside the traditional structures were shaken, especially in certain regions, by military operations, "preventive" repressive measures ("strategic hamlets"), and massive immigration (mainly to Zaire). At the same time, capitalist agriculture based on production for the world market was increasingly strengthened, at the expense of subsistence agriculture. As for the industrial economy, very important foreign investment was made in basic sectors (oil), in the small- and middle-sized transformation industry, and in the commercial network. This process was stepped up at the end of the 1960s and the beginning of the 1970s.




## RESOLUTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE FOURTH INTERNATIONAL

The following text on Angola was approved by the February 1976 meeting of the International Executive Committee of the Fourth International.

The result of these combined developments was that the relative weight of the capitalist structures increased, the working class became more numerous, as did other wage-earning sectors, the urban petty bourgeoisie was also strengthened, and the bourgeoisies of capitalist countries other than Portugal became increasingly interested in controlling Angola (the United States and the West European powers, mainly Britain). The war was also prolonged because the anticolonialist movement was deeply divided and the neighboring neocolonial states played an extremely ambiguous role. On the one hand, they could not avoid aiding the liberation movements; on the other hand, they tried to control them and fit them into their own political projects, going so far as to become vehicles for imperialist pressure. (The Congolese governments aided the FNLA to the detriment of the MPLA, fostering the wait-and-see military attitudes and equivocal political attitudes of the Holden Roberto leadership; Zambia vacillated in selecting its main ally.)

**3** The defeat of Portuguese imperialism was not solely military. In reality, it was determined by the colonial army's inability to crush the armed struggles of the Angolan people, by the major military defeats suffered by the imperialists in Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique, by the fact that the economic burdens of the war were becoming increasingly intolerable for Lisbon, and by the increasingly serious political consequences in the metropolis of the unending prolongation of the conflict.

During the first phase after April 25 the Spinoist project was to accept the accomplished fact of the complete victory of the PAIGC in Guinea-Bissau, to acquiesce to Frelimo's control of Mozambique (while not abandoning attempts at blackmail and pressure or rearguard battles), and to maneuver in Angola with the aim of preserving more direct influence and more substantial control than in the former colonies. Such an attitude was linked to the far greater importance of Angola to Portugal and to imperialism in general, both economically and strategically. But the decisive element was the division of the Angolan national movement and the possibility of exploiting this division politically and militarily. Because of the revolutionary crisis in the metropolis and the paralysis of the Portuguese bourgeois army, the Portuguese government was unable to carry its operation through successfully and found itself compelled to pull out. But other imperialist and neocolonialist forces (United States, South Africa, the countries of capitalist Europe, Zaire, Zambia) plunged into the open breach, thus contributing more or less directly to the outbreak of the civil war.



**4** The Angolan national movement dates back to the 1920s; ideologically, it goes back even to the end of the past century, and it has its roots in anticolonial struggles extending over four centuries. But it was in the middle and late 1950s that this movement began to

acquire considerable influence and to express itself in organized forms. The armed struggle began after the colonial regime rejected any concessions and under the impetus of African and world events (formation of a series of independent states on the continent, the Algerian war, the victory of the Cuban revolution, etc.).

Varied social and political forces participated in the movement: the urban petty bourgeoisie, the radicalized intelligentsia, militants and cadres coming out of the proletariat and peasantry, emigrés in the Congo, etc. It is almost symbolic that the initiatives that marked the opening of hostilities (in February and March 1961) were taken by the two social and political components that were active at the time (nuclei emerging from the petty bourgeoisie and poor masses in the cities, essentially under the influence of the MPLA, and nuclei emerging from the peasantry and the emigrés in the countryside, under the influence of the UPA, predecessor of the FNLA). From the beginning, both the breadth of the layers mobilizing or susceptible to mobilizing in the anti-imperialist struggle and at the same time the difficulty in establishing a united political and organizational framework were felt.

**5** During the period 1961-1966 the FNLA, led by Holden Roberto, succeeded in establishing a relationship of forces clearly in its favor.

The MPLA, whose original base was essentially urban, was harder hit by the repression unleashed in the wake of the 1961 actions and did not succeed in developing a base outside of the Cabinda enclave. Especially between 1961 and 1964 the MPLA went through a very critical phase during which, among other things, it maneuvered with small questionable groups and was seriously affected by a crisis of leadership that even led to the departure of the Viriato de Cruz group (a group claiming adherence to Marxism and to Maoist conceptions). Because of its orientation and its international links, the MPLA was particularly hampered by the action of the Congolese government, which sabotaged its activities and tried to eliminate it from the political scene.

The FNLA was in a better position to resist the repression because of its peasant base. It was able to take advantage of its presence in the border regions and the base it had among the masses of emigrés. It enjoyed aid from or tolerance of the successive governments of the Congo. In face of U.S. rejection of requests for material aid, it tried to take advantage of the Sino-Soviet conflict by initiating an opening toward Peking; it succeeded in getting the Organization of African Unity to recognize the government it had set up, the GRAE (Revolutionary Angolan Government in Exile). Even the tribal component (Bakongo) — always stronger in the FNLA than in the MPLA — represented a factor of strength at the time, since it assured, among other things, the vital links with the emigration and the Congo.



**6** The situation started to change beginning in 1966. The MPLA took the initiative again and, utilizing the forces it had consolidated in Cabinda and enjoying the tolerance if not active support of Zambia, opened up new zones of operation (in the East, the North, and later in the Northeast). In 1968 the MPLA declared that it held control of one-third of the territory. The strengthening of the MPLA was aided by its more flexible conception of guerrilla warfare and its efforts at organization in the liberated zones, where popular bodies arose in the form of village committees. Thus, it succeeded in overcoming the narrow framework of its previous sphere of action and in emerging as a force operating on a national scale.

During the same period, the FNLA adopted a fundamentally wait-and-see attitude, relying almost exclusively on its bases in the North and its Congolese "rear areas." Pressure from the Kinshasa government contributed to this orientation. Further, the FNLA suffered a split with the departure of Savimbi, who then formed the UNITA. For a long period, UNITA remained very weak, but its existence, under the leadership of a man with very important tribal connections like Savimbi, in any case represented a major obstacle to a national extension of the influence of the FNLA (and, likewise, an obstacle to a supplementary extension of the zone controlled by the MPLA). The change in the relationship of forces in the field was not without international repercussions: the MPLA strengthened its links with the workers states and the so-called progressive governments (while the FNLA established relations with China); the MPLA achieved a rectification of the attitude of the states of the OAU, a number of which established special relations with the MPLA and, in fact, assured it a status equal to that of the FNLA-GRAE.

**7** When the fascist regime in Lisbon collapsed, the Angolan national movement was still divided into three major tendencies. On several occasions, especially in 1972, attempts at unification had been made under the impetus of certain African governments, but without achieving any real results. There were new attempts in this direction in 1974. But it was only at the beginning of 1975 that the Alvor accords permitted the formation of a single government, under the auspices of the former colonial power.

The MPLA was threatened with being put in the position of paying the price for this operation, for three reasons:

- The FNLA and UNITA made a common front, utilizing tribal factors against the MPLA;
- The FNLA and UNITA were favored by the alliance with the neighboring neocolonial governments (with the sole exception of the Congo-Brazzaville, whose influence was necessarily limited);
- The FNLA and UNITA enjoyed the priority support of the imperialist powers.

The MPLA hoped to take advantage of the sympathy of a wing of the MFA — which led it to sow illusions in

the MFA and the Vasco Gonçalves government — but in practice it won only very limited and ephemeral advantages in this sphere during the administration of Rosa Coutinho. In addition, it suffered a very deep internal crisis, which divided it into three tendencies and exposed it very dangerously to the influence of neocolonial governments during a certain period.

In this context, the Alvor accords, later confirmed in Nakuru, were the basis of a broad neocolonial operation, at least potentially. But the outbreak of the civil war placed everything in question.

### III.

**8** The concretization of the Alvor project implied the constitution and maintenance of delicate balances among many interested forces, both Angolan and foreign (compromises among various social layers and different ethnic groups and regional formations, among various political and military apparatuses, conflicts of interest among various neocolonial states and various imperialist powers). Directly or indirectly, the Portuguese situation introduced other elements of disequilibrium and contradiction on several levels. But in the final analysis, it was the dynamic of the movement of the masses in the cities, especially in Luanda, that played the decisive role in the outbreak of the crisis.

The socioeconomic changes that had gone hand in hand with the colonial war had strengthened the specific weight of the urban layers. With the fall of the Caetano regime, all the previous balances were overturned. Petty-bourgeois layers occupied or hoped to occupy the positions abandoned by the fleeing colons. The intelligentsia wanted to seize the opportunity to play an important role in the administration and in the management of the country in general. The working class, whose numerical strength had been increased consequent to the relative industrialization, organized and mobilized to assert its rights and to achieve less miserable conditions. The proletarian and plebian masses of the urban slums in turn organized and mobilized in self-defense against the desperate actions of the hardline colonialists and racists.

Strikes, demonstrations, and mobilizations came one after another up to the great demonstration that assembled tens of thousands of people in Luanda and up to the holding of a national assembly of rank-and-file committees (a general strike had already occurred in Luanda in September 1973).

It was precisely the dynamization of these exploited urban layers, who were unable to be integrated into a neocolonial framework, that blew up the structure erected by the Alvor accords.

**9** The mobilization of the Luanda masses was not the result of a deliberate political initiative by the MPLA. In large measure it developed independent of the will of the MPLA leadership and largely outside its organizational framework (in fact, the MPLA's apparatus was not yet established when the mass mobilizations broke out). But because of its traditions, its previously developed roots, the character of at least some of its cadres, and its character as a national and not regional or tribal movement, the MPLA was in the best position to benefit from such a movement by enormously expanding its audience. Moreover, the MPLA faced a very concrete choice: either follow the Alvor orientation through to the end by fighting for a strict application of the accords, which would have implied, among other things, the disarming of "civilians" and entering into conflict with the movement of the masses, or integrate itself into this movement and take over leadership of it in an attempt to channel it at the same time. Given all the other elements acting against it and given that it lacked a sufficiently broad base among the peasantry, the MPLA could only choose the second solution.

The FNLA, on the other hand, which has no real base in the cities and which counted on being the main beneficiary of the Alvor accords, if not immediately at least in the medium term, launched an offensive against the movement of the masses, accompanied by a bloody repression. The aim was to impose its own control in the capital by cutting the ground from under the feet of its rival organization.

For its part, UNITA completed the turn that led it to drop its socialistic demagogy, abandon any attitude of neutrality, present itself to the Portuguese as the partner in the best position to aid in neocolonial reconversion, and line up with the FNLA. Its regional character, which permitted it to win a significant base, also made it easier for it to take positions against the movement of the urban masses in Luanda and to commit itself against the organization that enjoyed the confidence of these masses.

## IV.

**10** The concrete genesis of the civil war, the cleavage among the indigenous movements, and the international alignments shed unambiguous light on the fundamental nature of the Angolan conflict. On the one side are fundamentally ranged the social forces that have objective interests in struggling for consistent national independence and in rejecting neocolonial compromise solutions; this potentially inscribes these forces within a dynamic of permanent revolution, of the growing over of the national revolution into social revolution. These forces are: the decisive layers of the urban working class — both in industry and services — layers of the agricultural wage-earners, the plebeian masses cast out of the economic and social structure by colonialism, broad sectors of the petty bourgeoisie af-

ected by the wave of radicalization, sectors of the poor peasantry that participated in the armed struggle directly or indirectly and underwent their first experiences in political mobilization and organization by entering into conflict with the structure of traditional rural society.

On the other side stand those forces that cling to the privileges of the past, as ludicrous as these may be, those who have an interest in the establishment of a neocolonial society, those who do not want to sever the imperialist umbilical cord definitively, those who want to defend what remains of traditional society. These forces are: the remnants of the colons, the well-off layers of the petty bourgeoisie, the embryonic nuclei of the national bourgeoisie, the traditional chiefs and their acolytes. The outbreak of the civil war in conjunction with the movement of the urban masses reflects in a condensed — and simplified — form the sociopolitical content of the military confrontation.

The fact that the FNLA and UNITA are supported by American imperialism, the major European imperialist powers, the racists of South Africa, and the bloc of the most conservative or even reactionary neocolonial states, while the MPLA enjoys the support of the workers states (with the ignoble exception of China), primarily that of the Soviet Union and Cuba, and the neocolonial governments which are still unable to jettison either the traditions of struggle of their national movements or the mass sentiment that still exists or which want to polish up their "progressive" images confirms and strengthens the analysis of the dynamic of the indigenous forces. Moreover, it is clear that a possible victory for the FNLA-UNITA bloc would not only mark a success for the counterrevolution in Angola, with a tragic consequence of bloody repression, but would also strengthen the positions of imperialism in this region of very great strategic importance, would breathe new life into the South African racists, and would lead to the formation of more reactionary regimes in a series of African countries.

**11** The intervention of the imperialists in the Angolan civil war was inspired by their need to defend their extremely important economic, political, and strategic interests in Angola itself and above all throughout this region of Africa.

The U.S. government was subject to contradictory pressures: On the one hand, there were tendencies favoring an intervention because of specific economic interests or political considerations. On the other hand, there was resistance from groups that were concerned about the negative consequences for their interests in a series of African states that could result from a basic commitment to the FNLA-UNITA bloc and to the Pretoria regime; further, some politicians were more inclined to play the card of integrating the MPLA into a neocolonialist project. But the overall political and strategic stakes involved compelled Washington to opt for supporting the FNLA and UNITA. If this support has



so far not been translated into a direct military intervention, it is because of the situation created by the recent defeat in Vietnam and the fear of provoking a rebirth of the antiwar movement, especially among the Black minority. For its part, the South African regime was propelled to intervene because of its desire to defend long-standing economic interests and because of its concern for maintaining its strategic and political ramparts. The Pretoria regime committed itself especially because it is now being undermined by a serious crisis, a crisis that could come to a head in the event of a victory of the anti-imperialist forces in Angola and possibly in other countries of the region, stimulating the struggle of the most important proletariat of all Africa and placing the very existence of the regime in question.

The action of the Soviet bureaucracy is explained by its desire to play an important political role both in the region and in Africa in general and its determination not to relinquish at the decisive moment the advantages it may draw from the support it has long-since granted the MPLA. At the same time, the Soviet bureaucracy is motivated by the need to make gains against China in the international communist and workers movement and among the masses of the colonial or semicolonial countries. Nor may it be excluded that the internal situation in the Communist party of the Soviet Union on the eve of its new congress may be involved. The Cuban intervention, while reflecting the basic political accord between Havana and Moscow, has special importance because of the very fact of its massive and direct character; this intervention represents a genuine challenge to American imperialism, in the best traditions of revolutionary internationalism.

**12** The definition of the character of the civil war and the comprehension of the potential for a dynamic of permanent revolution, based on the analysis of the social forces and not of the political organizations, are not in contradiction with characterizing the MPLA as a movement with a petty-bourgeois leadership. The nature of the MPLA has been petty bourgeois since its origin, both because of its social composition and because of its political conceptions and orientations. To the extent that it acquired a mass influence, became an important component of the anti-imperialist movement, and committed itself to a prolonged armed struggle against Portuguese colonialism, the MPLA is, more precisely, an expression of a revolutionary petty-bourgeois nationalist current. The ideological and political influence exercised from the beginning by elements with Stalinist or Khrushchevist training is not in contradiction with the MPLA's ideology as a whole. This is true not only because petty-bourgeois revolutionaries can utilize Marxism, especially a deformed Marxism, as an ingredient in their conceptions, but more concretely because Stalinist theses on the revolution by stages and bureaucratic conceptions of the relationship



**the dynamization of the urban masses blew up the structure erected by the Alvor accords**

with the masses tend to coincide with the line of collaboration with the so-called national bourgeoisie, the conceptions of the state and party, and the bureaucratic methods of organization which have characterized and still characterize the MPLA. The fact that the MPLA organized committees in the liberated zones and, immediately after April 25, 1974, called for the creation of committees in the cities must not obscure the fact that these committees were conceived on the basis of paternalist and authoritarian criteria, that the internal functioning of the MPLA itself has always suffered from very serious bureaucratic deformations, that even during the past several months the MPLA's takeover of the mass movement in Luanda has entailed a restructuring of the committees from above, with the elimination of cadres and militants denounced as ultraleftists or anarchists and with severe purge measures.

**13** The rapid and substantial successes won by the army of the People's Republic of Angola are not the result solely of military superiority; they are explainable politically above all. While the FNLA and UNITA proved incapable of mobilizing the masses in their zones of influence or of raising the morale of their troops, the MPLA was able to rely on a solid urban base to start from. Up to now, the peasant masses have not played an active role. Nevertheless, their mobilization remains essential not only for a definitive victory in the civil war, but more generally for the future of the Angolan revolution. The decisive point remains the conquest of a broad peasant base. Any possible underestimation of these problems would have very negative consequences not only on the current military conflict but also and more generally on the future of the Angolan revolution. That is why it is a political priority to struggle for an agrarian reform that breaks the power of the large landlords and capitalist farmers, loosens the vice of poverty of subsistence agriculture and its remaining tribal structures, guarantees the small and middle peasants adequate prices for their products and allows them to escape the claws of the middlemen, and aids the population of the countryside in resolving the elementary problems created by the colonial war and the civil war.

At the same time, measures expropriating imperialist property — in any case a legitimate response to the combined military attacks against the People's Republic of Angola — would have the effect of solidifying the ranks of the anti-imperialist forces through concretely demonstrating to the masses that they are being called upon to fight in defense of their most pressing interests.

But the struggle for consistent anti-imperialist objectives must go hand in hand with the revolutionary and democratic rank-and-file organization of the masses. The experiences of the past two years, especially at the height of the urban mobilizations, must be maximally capitalized on by the relaunching of democratic and revolutionary bodies whose leaders are elected by the masses and can be removed if they do not accomplish their tasks, leaders who do not enjoy any material privileges. The strictest respect for democratic rights, including the right of expression of the various political currents and organizations, is a necessity that is particularly felt after centuries of colonization and long years of merciless imperialist repression. A mass democratic revolutionary organization opposing any bureaucratic grip or authoritarian constraint also represents a crucially important instrument for the struggle against traditional reactionary structures and tribal remnants.

Militants who have gone through the struggle experiences of the past two or three years and who have assimilated the lessons of the anticapitalist struggles of the masses of other countries, including East Europe, can and must play an important role in this battle. Finally, the anti-imperialist struggle of the Angolan masses will be strengthened to the extent that tight

links are established with the revolutionary movements of southern Africa, which, through their struggle, are weakening the racist regimes of Pretoria and Salisbury, ramparts of imperialism in this part of the continent.

**14** The catastrophic military defeats of the FNLA and UNITA have compelled the imperialist and neocolonial forces to revise their policy. Some neocolonial governments have already made a turn: They have recognized the People's Republic of Angola and are seeking a compromise with the MPLA. The imperialists of the United States and West Europe could follow them down this road, working out a wide-ranging operation to integrate the People's Republic of Angola more or less quickly into a relatively "progressive" neocolonial project. Well-off petty-bourgeois circles, embryonic nuclei of the "national" bourgeoisie, an entire constellation of profiteers and careerists provide the material base for such an operation. The rightist tendencies of the MPLA, which had already been leaning toward compromise solutions, particularly with UNITA, may play the game through to the end. This project of the MPLA leadership — expressed, for example, in the basic law of the People's Republic — is not at all in contradiction with such a neocolonial operation, as is confirmed, among other things, by the recent overtures toward Zaire and Zambia.

In face of such a possibility — and in any case to prevent the rapid defeat of the enemy from paradoxically having negative consequences for the revolutionary struggle — it appears all the more necessary to mobilize and organize the masses into democratic bodies that guarantee mass autonomy of any exploiting class and any bureaucratic apparatus. This task, which will not be accomplished by the petty-bourgeois leadership of the MPLA, will have to be taken up on a priority basis by revolutionaries linked to the mass movement.



**15** The resolution on Africa adopted at the Eighth World Congress of the Fourth International in 1965 declared in regard to Angola:

"It is clear that a genuine revolutionary Angolan leadership does not yet exist and that internal conflicts and struggles of the nationalist movement will probably continue to appear for a whole period. In determining which field of action they will give preference, the fundamental criterion for revolutionary Marxists is who at a given stage exercises real mass influence and who is actually fighting, because that is where the logic of the revolutionary struggle most easily permits the formation of a revolutionary vanguard. The line of a leadership or a few leaders cannot be a decisive criterion, all the less so in the case of insinuations or suspicions about this or that person. . . . Without hiding its crit-



icisms and while developing its own concepts on the nature of the Angolan revolution, the Fourth International will continue to solidarize with the forces in actual struggle, which are primarily the peasant forces organized at the present stage essentially in the FNLA. The Fourth International holds that the unification of the FNLA with other existing forces (which the FNLA says it favors in principle) would prove profitable, naturally on condition that it be realized in the struggle, on the basis of a clear anti-imperialist and anticolonialist program, without which the indispensable unity in the armed struggle would suffer."

Although the criteria applied were correct and the analysis of the relationship of forces in the field was basically accurate, a self-criticism is nonetheless necessary; it can be synthesized in the following terms:

a) The February 1964 resolution of the United Secretariat and the resolution of the Eighth World Congress overestimated the possibilities of the FNLA's overcoming its tribal origins and the consequences of its regional dependence and thus of escaping the influence exercised by the neocolonial Congolese governments, vehicles for imperialist pressure.

b) The same resolutions did not take account of the MPLA's possibilities and capacities of relaunching action in other parts of the country and underestimated the role that could be played in that event by its ideology, which is more progressive than that of the FNLA.

c) The Fourth International delayed considerably in the analytical verification of the situation in Angola and consequently in making the necessary political and tactical adjustments. Even the resolution of the Tenth World Congress in February 1974 limited itself to the very general assertion that "the furtherance of the process of permanent revolution . . . can only be carried out on the basis of a clarification within the MPLA and Frelimo" and pointed to "the task of building revolutionary Marxist cadres."

**16** In the civil war that broke out on the eve of the formal proclamation of independence, the Fourth International chases the camp of the People's Republic of Angola founded by the MPLA against the holy alliance of imperialists, racists, and indigenous reactionaries. It stands on the side of the masses who are mobilizing to defend the independence won through a determined armed struggle, to defend their primordial interests against all exploiting layers and classes, both foreign and "national," for the expropriation of the capitalists and landed proprietors and the formation of a workers and peasants government based on democratic revolutionary committees, direct expressions of the masses.

Such an attitude in no way implies that the Fourth International abandons its criticisms of the MPLA leadership, which it characterizes as petty-bourgeois nationalist and not as proletarian communist, and which will

not be able to carry out the task of building a workers state. Alignment in the same camp and solidarity in a common struggle are not in contradiction with the indispensable battle for the political independence of the working class and revolutionaries and for the construction of a proletarian revolutionary leadership and a revolutionary Marxist organization.

Angolan revolutionary Marxists unreservedly commit themselves to the military struggle against the reactionary holy alliance until the definitive victory, for the defense of the People's Republic of Angola, for the complete independence of Angola. In their political campaign they emphasize the necessity for an active and conscious mobilization of the masses, for their organization into democratic and revolutionary committees, the delegates elected and revocable at all times; they further emphasize the defense of democratic rights for all those fighting in the anti-imperialist camp. They carry out an indispensable task of theoretical and political clarification on the nature and strategy of the revolution in Angola by attempting first to regroup the cadres and militants who have already undergone experiences in struggle and mass mobilization and have critically reflected on these experiences.

**17** The Fourth International must take an active part in a campaign of solidarity with the People's Republic of Angola organized on a world scale. This campaign should demand the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of all imperialist and neocolonialist forces; it should call for political and material aid from the workers states and the international workers movement, the halt of all shipments of arms and matériel to the FNLA-UNITA bloc, and the recognition of the MPLA and the People's Republic of Angola.

The Fourth International denounces the attitude of the Chinese bureaucratic leadership, which, after aiding the FNLA, is now adopting a hypocritical neutral attitude, thus giving a practical demonstration of the nefarious character of its conceptions and analyses and of a policy based on denouncing the USSR as the main enemy, a policy actually aimed at reaching a compromise with American, European, and Japanese imperialism.

African revolutionary Marxists, conscious that the defeat of the imperialists and neocolonialists in the Angolan civil war would have enormous repercussions throughout the continent, would create favorable conditions for the overthrow of the racist regimes of South Africa, Namibia, and Zimbabwe, and would undermine the bases of the reactionary neocolonial regimes, will campaign for militant support to the People's Republic and the Angolan fighters in the circles of the African political vanguard, in the mass organizations, in the trade unions, and in the organizations of workers and students abroad.

February 14, 1976

The political crisis now affecting Zambia has reached new heights with events in the past month. The UNIP (United National Independence party) government is now recognizably threatened on both left and right. It is probably less popular than ever among the urban population, which constitutes the only significant barometer of political mood.

The students at UNZA (the University of Zambia in Lusaka) have been foremost in articulating opposition to the regime. A consistent campaign against the government's policy on Angola has been conducted on that campus since the beginning of the new year. Zambian policy on Angola has been determined by a number of considerations, which were outlined at length in the article "Zambia — Repercussions of the Angolan Civil War" (see INPRECOR, No. 43, February 5, 1976). Briefly, these are:

1. The desire to reopen full trade relations with white-ruled Rhodesia and South Africa following the total failure to achieve any significant measure of import-substitution through attempted industrialization programs.
2. A fear of the dynamic involved in a victory of the MPLA, an event that has already shown that it is likely to accelerate the process of opening full-scale war by the oppressed population against the remaining strongholds of white racism. Such a development could rapidly open the way to a sustained anti-imperialist and anticapitalist mobilization throughout southern Africa.
3. Recently, an actual dependence on South Africa through the now well-known measures of economic support provided by the Vorster regime to Zambia's ailing economy.

It was above all this open collaboration with the forces of imperialism and racism that fueled the protests of Zambia's university students. This generation has been brought up on a diet consisting of constant evocations of the sacrifices the country has supposedly made to support its brothers and sisters struggling against the white regimes. The increasingly obvious contradiction of these principles involved in Zambia's Angolan policy was certain to raise big doubts. When a relatively small group of militants began to explain the roots of this policy and to campaign for its reversal, they met with a mass response that went far beyond their wildest hopes or expectations. This development was a clear lesson in the intrinsic relevance of international issues to the awakening of consciousness in the neocolonial countries of Africa. Events in Angola have demonstrated on a day-to-day level the intimate ties existing between the Zambian ruling group and imperialism. For the more conscious sections of the population, these events have given a clearer picture than a thousand articles could have given of the real class nature of the regime.

Serious organizing in solidarity with the MPLA began at the university as soon as the new term opened on January 5. The campaign was initiated largely by supporters of the Franz Fanon Society, a socialist discus-

# Zambia: OPPOSITION TO KAUNDA RISES

by JOHN BLAIR

sion group that has served as a focus for the regroupment of radicals on the campus. This group is the only overtly political organization at UNZA, where attempts to establish a branch of the UNIP have been frustrated for many years by opposition from the students.

Agitation met with an immediate response from the mass of students, culminating in a one-day strike on January 15, the object of which was to demand that the government immediately reverse its stand on the Angolan civil war and give full support to the MPLA. During the strike the campus was occupied by the students and mass meetings were held throughout the day to discuss the reasons behind the action. The authorities made every effort to suppress any news of this event. While the strike was headlined on Luanda radio, it was ignored by the rest of the Zambian newspapers, radio, and television. Throughout the day the campus was surrounded by armed police, but no attempt was made to enter the premises. All traffic was diverted off the Great East Road, which passes the front entrance of the university, in order to prevent passing travelers from seeing the big posters that had been hung up proclaiming solidarity with the MPLA.

The first public manifestation of the government's concern about the situation at UNZA came on Sunday, January 25, when demonstrations in support of official policy on Angola were staged in Lusaka and Ndola, the copperbelt center. At the Ndola rally, featured speaker Frank Chitambala, UNIP central committee member, indirectly revealed the real reasons behind the demonstrations when he mentioned "misguided foreign lecturers" at UNZA who had supposedly been "fomenting trouble among students" by whipping up support for a line opposed to the government's foreign policy.

News of the plans for pro-government demonstrations came late to UNZA activists. They were therefore able to distribute leaflets aimed at dissuading potential participants only at Evelyn Hone College, an institution of higher education. The result was that not a single student from that institution participated in the demonstration. But militants were still able to disrupt the



plans of the UNIP somewhat. Arriving at the assembly point before the organizers of the demonstration, they distributed large numbers of leaflets explaining the reasons for giving support to the MPLA. They were read and digested by the approximately 800 Lusaka secondary school students who had been cajoled into attending the march to State House (the presidential residence). The effects of these efforts became clear during the course of President Kenneth Kaunda's speech. Utilizing his well-known gimmick of crowd involvement, on several occasions he bellowed the question, "Who do we support?" In response to this came a clear chant of "MPLA" instead of the hoped for answer of "a government of national unity."

Events moved rapidly toward confrontation after these opening salvos. On the evening of January 28 Kaunda went on radio and television and announced the institution of a full "state of emergency" throughout the country. Since Zambia has been under a "partial" state of emergency since the unilateral declaration of independence by Rhodesia in November 1965, it is difficult to immediately assess what the precise legal changes are that have been introduced now. But strong emphasis was laid on the suspension of all guarantees under Article Three of the constitution, which is concerned with elementary democratic and civil rights. Its revocation amounts to a total removal of the basic freedoms of speech, assembly, etc., and to allowing the police force to enter any premises without a warrant.

The first arrest under the new powers came on Saturday, January 31, when Lionel Cliffe, a British lecturer at UNZA, was seized and detained for 28 days. No reasons for his arrest were given, but his wife stated that police had removed literature on Angola from their house on the campus. Cliffe was well known as an activist in the British Committee for Freedom in Mozambique, Angola, and Guinea-Bissau between 1971 and 1974. Prior to this he had worked for ten years at the Tanzanian university of Dar es Salaam where he had acted for a long period in an advisory capacity to the government. Zambia's position on Angola was demonstrated very starkly by the detention of a person whose

record showed him to be a consistent fighter against imperialism.

Cliffe's detention threw the university into a state of ferment that culminated in a general strike on February 5. This time the anger of the students was particularly directed at two members of the staff accused of collaborating with government attempts at repression. Dean of the arts and social science faculty, Ndem, a Nigerian, had refused to call a meeting of the staff to discuss the jailing of Cliffe. Mutukwa, a Zambian colleague of Cliffe's in the political science department, was accused of having played a part in the government's attempts to implicate Cliffe in the organization of pro-MPLA actions on the campus. The strike demanded the immediate dismissal of these two men.

The government responded rapidly. On February 7 armed police surrounded the campus. The pretext for this action was an incident in which a student who was well known to be one of numerous police agents working in the area pulled a gun on a group of students who had begun to taunt him in the refectory. A near riot situation developed and the police stooge appears to have been lucky to have escaped without injury.

A full blockade of the campus went into effect; those inside could not receive food and the half of the campus population that had gone into the center of Lusaka for the day was prevented from returning and was forced to sleep outside. On the same day, three more members of the staff were arrested:

1. Siemensma, a Dutchman, who was reported to have been sending reports (presumably accurate and therefore embarrassing to the government) to the media in Holland on the situation at UNZA.
2. D. Longhi, an Italian lecturer in the department of sociology, who was said to have been "instrumental in attempting to secure the release of Cliffe."
3. Perhaps the most embarrassing for the government, Robert Moltano, a stateless South African refugee, who had been on the staff for eight years. During that time he is known to have acted as a government adviser for several periods. He is also known to the entire first year secondary school population as the author of a textbook entitled "The Zambian Community and Its Government," which is compulsory reading in the newly introduced civics course. The purpose of this new civics course is to inculcate an admiration for the one-party state and its institutions in the minds of young Zambians. It must be said that Moltano's book does as good a job as possible in fulfilling the difficult task of making this system appear "humanist" and democratic. Moltano's crime appears to have been that he took the government at its word and was centrally involved in organizing the production of a letter signed by 75 members of the staff protesting Cliffe's detention as a blow against the principles of academic freedom and calling for his immediate reinstatement "with honor."

It is clear that the decision to close the university was heavily influenced by the fact that a solid bloc of

staff and students opposed to the government's repressive policies appeared to be assembling. On the night of February 7 the police moved onto the campus and escalated their brutality in a clear attempt to provoke a confrontation that would enable the closing of the university to be blamed on the students. These tactics largely failed. But on Monday, February 9, Education Minister Mulikita went on the radio and announced the closing of UNZA for an indefinite period, which he said was being done in order to avoid the "inevitable bloodshed and damage to property" that would ensue if the university remained open. Students were given 10 Kwacha (1 Kwacha = US\$1.40) for travel expenses, bundled into buses under police and army supervision, and dumped at Lusaka's main bus station to await transportation home. Twenty-one students were added to the four lecturers in detention. They included the entire executive committee of the students union as well as a number of known activists involved in organizing the events of the previous week. These new arrests made it impossible for the government to consider keeping the university open for fear of the protests that would follow.

Four weeks of intense political ferment at the university then came to an end. In the course of these weeks, hundreds of students had been radicalized and had come to understand the real nature of their "humanist" government's policies in at least one crucial area. Government spokespeople prided themselves on having given a lesson to upstart students and, above all, to those lecturers who had "infiltrated" the institution as "agents of superpowers." But the Zambian public was clearly less impressed. On the following Sunday, February 15, the Sunday Times, the government-controlled newspaper, printed one of its supplements called "the people talking." This column carries comments on a current event by 20 or 30 "members of the public." Not one person could be found who would express outright support for the closing of UNZA in the special supplement devoted to this question. The general level of comment was best summarized by the individual who decried the fact that the government could spend so much energy on dealing with a couple thousand students while it displayed little fervor in tackling the economic problems affecting the general public. Far from having achieved its objective of isolating student activists from the mass of the population, it would appear that the government may have acted in such a way as to contribute to cutting down barriers between the students and the general public. It is not yet known when the university will reopen and no word has yet appeared on the fate of the detainees. But it seems likely that when the students do return to the campus they will not have undergone any significant demoralization or reduction in their capacity for anti-government mobilization.

Central to continuing high morale will be the fact that the MPLA has been victorious and that, despite attempts to cover this up with various complex formulas, Zambia will be forced to grant *de facto* if not *de jure* recognition to the new government — a move dictated above all by the desire to ensure the rapid re-opening of the

Benguela railway. In this new situation, it is going to be acutely embarrassing for the government to continue to hold 25 people in detention for any length of time because they advocated a course of action now forced on a reluctant administration by actual events. Thus, when students return to UNZA it is certain that they will be collectively conscious that their struggle has been victorious. Such a situation will place agitation for a further development of political consciousness on extremely favorable terrain.

But opposition at the university to the government's stand on Angola was not the only threat facing the government in this period. In the copperbelt a massive response was evoked by the government's plans to integrate mine housing with that of the local authorities. In the past, mine workers have lived in mine houses frequently located in compounds entirely separate from those of the rest of the population. In these they have enjoyed rents on the average well below those of local authority tenants. Some services such as water have been supplied free and, due to the more efficient nature of the management, essential matters such as the maintenance of property have been dealt with more promptly. Thus, the announcement that local authorities would now take over management of all mine housing was greeted with dismay. In Chingola, Kitwe, and Luanshya the official commission of inquiry designated to investigate the issue was greeted by rowdy meetings organized by local branches of the MUZ (Mine Workers Union of Zambia). At Rokana mine in Kitwe on January 21, the commission was prevented from carrying out any public hearings when thousands of miners laid siege to the meeting place.

Among those quick to capitalize on the situation were the remnants of the United Progressive party (UPP), which originated in a split from the UNIP in 1971 led by former vice-president Simon Kapwepwe. The UPP was banned in 1972, immediately prior to the introduction of the one-party state. Trading on their historic base in the copperbelt (Mufulira was the only place in which the UPP managed to win a parliamentary election during its brief existence), former UPP activists who have always maintained informal links began to organize to rebuild their support. They undoubtedly played an important role in some of the mobilizations against the commission. The UPP is in no sense a progressive opposition to the UNIP. In fact, one of its main planks in the early 1970s was for the reopening of full economic relations with white-ruled southern Africa. Furthermore, the leadership was always composed overwhelmingly of Bemba, the tribal grouping dominant in the copperbelt, who had seen themselves excluded from political office by Kaunda's constant emphasis on maintaining a balance in leading positions. Thus support for the UPP has often tended to be based on a crude tribalism.

The active re-emergence of this tendency was accompanied by a renewed polarization inside Zambia's one-party parliament. Here the leading spokesman for the right is undoubtedly Arthur Wina, former minister of finance and now a member of parliament from Living-

stone, who is a leading businessman and chairman of the Zambia National Council for Commerce and Industry. On January 21, Wina launched a full-scale attack in parliament on the fact that the Rhodesian border continues to be closed to Zambian rail or road traffic, charging that the reopening of this border was an economic necessity for the country despite any political considerations. He was supported by many MPs, some of whom used the opportunity to launch attacks on Zimbabwean freedom fighters, accusing them of having failed to use the correct tactics in unifying and thus failing to win liberation. It was said that Zambia was being drained by its support to these ungrateful traitors to Africa.

Even though the speaker of parliament attempted to close this debate by declaring that the matter had been conclusively dealt with in Kaunda's January 24 refusal to consider the question, Wina popped up again on February 4. His new speech broadened out into what could be characterized as the beginning of a manifesto for the right. Once again he demanded that the border be re-opened "to save a collapsing economy." He went on to attack an easy target: the government's totally ineffective attempts to promote cooperative farming in Zambia. He said: "We should give support to commercial farmers before we use our money on experiments in collectivized farming, etc. It is not groups of people who are going to feed the nation, but individuals." He went on to draw unfavorable comparisons with the situation in Malawi, a country which, he claimed, was able to feed itself and even to increase agricultural exports because of its unabashed faith in private enterprise farming.

On February 5, Whiteson Banda, Malambo MP, spoke on the same theme, declaring: "Development programs will never succeed without the help of foreign investment. The party and government's shift toward socialism is scaring away would be investors and, if not relaxed, will lead to the collapse of the economy."

Thus, the past few weeks have seen the clear re-emergence of a right-wing tendency that is impatient to dispense with the clap-trap of Kaunda's "humanism" and his verbal commitments to socialism (however far afield the actions of the government are from this goal) in favor of an explicit orientation toward the development of a private enterprise economy.

The economic measures taken at the end of January might further embarrass the government. On January 30, Minister of Finance Mwanashiku presented his budget, which increased prices of petrol, beer, tobacco, and other "luxuries." On Sunday, February 1, came an announcement of criminal increases in the price of corn meal, the staple food of Zambia's population. A 110-pound bag of breakfast meal was increased from K4.10 to K9. Roller meal was upped from K3.20 to K3.96. In an attempt to justify this, Kaunda was actually quoted as saying that breakfast meal was a luxury food, eaten only by the *apamwambas* (top people). In fact, as was pointed out by numerous people asked

for comment by the press, roller meal is so crudely manufactured that it is virtually inedible and involves a large amount of waste. Thus, breakfast meal has generally been used by larger and larger sections of the population; doubling its price was a body blow to their living standards.

Statistics are not yet available on the rate of inflation over the immediate past period. But in the first six months of 1975 the low-income index increased at an annual rate of 14%, while wage increases are limited by law to 5% annually. The latest increase in price of Zambia's staple food will undoubtedly accelerate the rate of inflation considerably and will serve to fuel the already apparent flames of discontent.

Thus, the immediate perspective for the Zambian government is one of difficulties on every front. In spite of its disclaimers, it remains extremely likely that the government will try to gain a temporary respite through the further development of trade and financial links with the white racist regimes of southern Africa as well as through a re-opening of the Rhodesian border in order to provide itself with the fastest route to the sea and a recognition of the MPLA in Angola (after a decent interval) to ensure its access to the Benguela railway. But these measures will not resolve the problems arising from the gross imbalance of Zambia's "monomineral" economy and the conjunctural effects of the worldwide recession of the imperialist economies.

The crucial task in the immediate future is to convince the radicalized student population of the need to begin work directed toward the working class, whose living standards are under attack. It is certain that at least one of the considerations involved in the government's decision to close the university was the fact that radical elements involved in the struggle to win support for the MPLA were already beginning to pose the need to take a clear public stand on the price increases and were even attempting to initiate actions on this question. The leap in consciousness that has taken place on the question of Angola must now be utilized to develop a more rounded understanding of the precise nature of Zambia's neocolonial regime. Such a task is all the more urgent because the thoroughly bourgeois politics of individuals like Wina and Kapwepwe can win a big influence among workers in the immediate period. While in the long run their projects are even less likely to secure economic development and a rise in prosperity than those of the UNIP government, they possess a superficial attraction because of their promise to halt the decline in living standards.

It seems likely that a period is opening in which the credibility of the UNIP leadership will dwindle still further in the face of a growing threat from both left and right. It is of decisive importance that the left, whose potential has been shown by the events at UNZA over the past month, now begin to develop the capability to intervene on much broader fronts.

February 20, 1976

# "ROUGE" GOES DAILY!

March 15, 1976, marks an important date in the development of the Fourth International. For the first time, one of its sections, the Ligue Communiste Révolutionnaire (Revolutionary Communist League) in France, will begin publication of a daily newspaper. A result of an enormous effort — financially through the collection of the equivalent of more than half a million dollars from tens of thousands of sympathizers of the new daily and technically through construction of a modern printshop — the appearance of the Quotidien Rouge is a measure of the progress of the French section of the Fourth International, of its growing proletarianization and of its impact on layers of the vanguard going far beyond those that contributed to launching the weekly Rouge just after May 1968.

The birth of the Quotidien Rouge is in the image of the qualitative growth of the Fourth International as a whole. Not only in the sense that the new daily will in part also be the daily of our entire International, but also and above all in the sense that its emergence coincides with the progress that has been under way since the beginning of this year in the press of many sections. To mention only the most important cases:

\*Since its extraordinary congress of January 1976, the Liga Comunista Internacionalista (Internationalist Communist League), sympathizing section of the Fourth International in Portugal, has been regularly publishing a weekly, *Luta Proletária*.

\*As of March 15, *Was Tun*, organ of the Gruppe Internationale Marxisten (International Marxist Group), German section of the Fourth International, also becomes a weekly.

\*Since January 1976, *Direct Action*, organ of the Socialist Workers League, a sympathizing organization in Australia, has been a weekly.

\*The comrades of the Liga Comunista Revolucionaria/Euzkadi ta Askatasuna-VI (Revolutionary Communist League/Basque Nation and Freedom-VI) in Spain are preparing to issue a large-scale weekly with several regional editions beginning in a few weeks, even if this weekly will not yet be legal, in spite of the progress of the revolution in Spain.

\*The comrades of the Liga Socialista (Socialist League), section of the Fourth International in Venezuela, are in the process of transforming their organ, *Voz Socialista*, into a weekly.

\*The comrades of the International Marxist Group, British section of the Fourth International, are in the process of expanding their newspaper, *Red Weekly*, to sixteen pages.

\*The comrades of the Ligue Révolutionnaire des Travailleurs/Revolutionaire Arbeiders Liga (Revolutionary Workers League), Belgian section of the Fourth International, are in the process of expanding their two weeklies, *La Gauche* (in French) and *Rood* (in Flemish), to twelve pages each.

The expansion of the press of the Fourth International is but the reflection of the expansion of the organization itself, of its numerical strength, its worker and trade-union implantation, its political maturity, and its effective intervention in the class struggle. We are fully conscious of how modest and insufficient this progress remains when compared with the immensity of the tasks involved in the construction of a new revolutionary leadership of the world proletariat in face of the growing crisis of imperialism, capitalism, and Stalinism. The birth of the Quotidien Rouge, like all the progress now being made in the international Trotskyist press, shows that genuine advances are being made toward carrying out these tasks. It also implies an opening toward the revolutionary forces with which a programmatic basis and common action can be established with the aim of strengthening the national organizations and the International. The fact that the Quotidien Rouge is born under the sign of this opening is also a reflection of a process of maturation.

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